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Article
THE KIDNAPPING OF EDGARDO MORTARA:
CONTEMPORARY LESSONS IN THE CHILD WELFARE WARS
BRUCE A.

BOYER*

STEVEN LUBET**

I.

IN

INTRODUCTION

recent years, with increasing regularity, legal scholars and other commentators have called for changes in the legal systems and rules that
govern child welfare.' Much of this discourse has been driven by a series
of wrenching custody cases, in which judges have been called upon to balance the claims of biological parents against those of third parties who
have established durable attachments with children in their care. Understandably, public opinion almost invariably supports the "de facto" or "psychological" parents, on the ground that it would do enormous harm to
remove young children from a nurturing home. At the same time, claims
of birth parents tend to be discounted as rigid formalities-mere procedural rights of adults that should not be allowed to interfere with the obvious and unarguable interests of the children. For their part, judges may
find themselves frustrated by these same procedural rights, which limit
their freedom to reach decisions that seem clearly in the "best interest" of
the child.
Accordingly, commentators,journalists and politicians have called for
changes in the law that would allow judges greater freedom to abrogate
the rights of biological parents in favor of others who are "attached to
their children in all the essential emotional and caregiving ways." 2 For
example, Mary Ann Mason, a professor of social welfare at the University
of California, recently put it this way:
The point of establishing a de facto parent principle would be to
allow judges-who are currently required by custody laws to favor
biological parents unless they're legally proved unfit-to give
these de facto parents the nod when, in fact, it appeared to be in
the best interests of the children. Judges would still have discre* Senior Lecturer and Supervising Attorney, Children & Family Justice
Center, Northwestern University School of Law
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
1. See Donald N. Duquette et al., We Know Better Than We Do: A Policy Framework For Child Welfare Reform, 31 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 93, 93 (1997) ("The need for
comprehensive reform of child welfare policies and systems has long been
evident.").

2. Mary Ann Mason, FosteringFamily, NEw

REPUBLIc,

Aug. 30, 1999, at 14.
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tion; the only difference would be that they'd have more discre3
tion than they do now.
In other words, judicially determined "best interests" could become
the principal reason for depriving "legally fit" parents of their children
and awarding custody instead to adopting parents, foster parents or residential stepparents. 4 This enhanced judicial discretion is seen as a progressive change because the analysis would begin with "the rights of the
children in question rather than those of the parents fighting for
custody."
Everyone favors the protection of children's best interests. It turns
out, however, that the strength of best interest determinations has everything to do with the quality of the decisionmaker's judgment. 6 In practice, the best interest of a child may not be so easy to recognize, and
cultural, ethnic or religious biases may muddy the decision. 7 Although all
judges presumably do their best to make the right rulings in cases affecting children, it takes a good deal of naive faith to assume that all judges
will inevitably use enhanced discretion wisely. One need only look at the
array of custody decisions in divorce cases governed by the best interest
standard to see that mistakes, even tragic mistakes, happen all the time.In much of the commentary calling for reform of custody laws, insufficient regard has been paid to the protections of due process that, ultimately, guard against the inevitable risk of governmental interference with
families whose gravest offense is their failure to conform. 9 In this Article,
3. Id. at 15.
4. See id. Professor Mason adds that "most nannies" would not meet threshold
for obtaining custody. See id. Some nannies apparently would meet the threshold,
however, raising a chilling implication that Professor Mason does not explore. See
id. (choosing qualified descriptor "most" to modify "nannies").
5. Id.
6. For a discussion of the best interest standard and its effect, see infra notes
67-69 and accompanying text.
7. See Mason, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing best interest standard).
8. For example, in 1994, Susan Smith was awarded custody of her two sons in
a divorce proceeding, presumably because the court determined that would be in
the children's best interest. See Here's a Chronology of Events in Susan Smith's Life,
CHATrANOOGA TIMES,

July 24, 1995, at A7 (providing timeline of Susan Smith

case). Exactly two weeks later, Ms. Smith strapped the boys into car seats and
rolled her automobile into a lake, drowning them. See id. Ms. Smith subsequently
confessed to the crime and was convicted of murder. See id.; see also Art Barnum &
Ted Gregory, Mother is Denied Bond in Slayings; PsychiatricExam Set for Naperville Suspect, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1999, at Al (describing case in which custodial parent,
Marilyn Lemak, was charged with suffocating her three children.)
9. Consider the case of Margaret Wambles, a white woman whose son was
forcibly removed by an Alabama police officer following a complaint that she was
"living with a black man and entertaining other black men." Roe v. Conn, 417 F.
Supp. 769, 774-75 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (describing events prior to seizure of child in
case and noting that "[t]he only facts about Margaret Wambles known to Judge
Thetford before he issued the pick-up order were that she was unemployed and
that she and her child are white and were living with a black man in a black neigh-
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we will use the 19th Century case of Edgardo Mortara, a six-year-old Italian
Jewish child forcibly removed from his family so that he could be raised by
Christians, as a template for understanding the inherent limitations of the
so-called "best interest" standard. 10 As we shall detail in Part II, Edgardo
was taken from his parents by the Papal police and eventually adopted by
the Pope himself.1 " The boy's seizure was justified as essential to his best
interest, and the rights of his biological parents were dismissed as secon12
dary to Edgardo's "obvious welfare."
As evidenced by Edgardo's story, there are old themes inherent in the
tension between the rights of families and the State's obligation as parens
patriae to protect its children from harm. Part III of this Article examines
the broad contours of the ongoing debate over the permissible scope of
state intervention to protect child welfare. 13 It highlights the tension between the traditions of family autonomy and due process that shelter modern families from such intrusion, and the state's legitimate parens patriae
interest in taking steps necessary to guard a child at risk. 14 In Part IV, we
revisit the story of Edgardo Mortara and the aftermath of his kidnapping,
suggesting that these competing notions of due process and parens patriae
explain much of the battle that defined the future of a boy whose parents'
only offense was having been born Jewish. 15 Part V seeks to project the
lessons of Edgardo's story into contemporary child welfare history by exborhood"). A juvenile court judge, vested with great discretion by the Alabama
statute, subsequently deprived her of custody, holding that "it was not a healthy
thing for a white child to be the only [white] child in a black neighborhood." Id.
at 775.
10. The tragic story of Edgardo Mortara is familiar in broad outline to most
students of Jewish history. See, e.g., 5 HEINRICH GRAETZ, HISTORY OF THE JEws 70001 (1895) (citing Mortara's story as example of persecution that "awakened a feeling of brotherhood unexampled in Jewish history since the separation of Israel
from Judah"). Mortara's story was recently explored in compelling detail in David
Kertzer's brilliant book, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara. See generally DAVID
KERTZER, THE KIDNAPPING OF EDGARDO MORTARA 97 (1997) (offering most comprehensive collection and translation of history of Edgardo Mortara's life to date).
Through his own translations of documents from Papal and other archives,
Kertzer, a professor of anthropology at Brown University, brings to light the whole
agonizing story, much of it previously unknown or only dimly understood. See id.
at 299-306 (explaining dearth of historical work on Mortara, reasons for his interest in story and process when researching his book). For a discussion of the 19th
Century case of Edgardo Mortara, see infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of Edgardo Mortara's life, see infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
12. See KERTZER, supra note 10, at 97 ("In such a case, canon law held, the
importance of allowing a soul to go to heaven outweighed the customary commitment to parental (and especially paternal) authority over children.").
13. For discussion of the ongoing debate over the permissible scope of state
intervention, see infra notes 44-94 and accompanying text.
14. For discussion of the tension between state and family interests, see infra
notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
15. For discussion of the lessons learned from Edgardo Mortara, see infra
notes 119-96 and accompanying text.
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ploring several more recent episodes that echo many of the same disturbing concerns.' 6 In Part VI, we conclude that the cautions arising from
Edgardo's kidnapping continue to resonate today, and that concerns over
unfettered state authority should not be taken lightly. 17 The amorphous
goal of protecting a child's best interests is easier to expound than to
achieve, while the erosion of due process safeguards may impose far
greater costs than many have been willing to recognize.
II.

THE KIDNAPPING OF EDGARDO MORTARA

On the evening of June 23, 1858, an officer of the Papal police
knocked urgently on the door of Signor Momolo Mortara, a Jewish
merchant living in the Italian city of Bologna.1 8 Marshall Pietro Lucidi,
accompanied by several other of the Pope's carabiniere,demanded entry to
the apartment.1 9 The Mortaras-Momolo and his wife Marianna-were
understandably apprehensive, suspecting and dreading the likely reason
for police interest in their family. 20 Their worst fears were confirmed
when Marshall Lucidi began questioning them about the names and ages
of their eight children. 2 ' His interest quickly focused on six-year-old Edgardo. "Your son Edgardo has been baptized," Lucidi informed the terri22
fied parents, "and I have been ordered to take him with me."
At that moment, the Mortara's world collapsed. Through a relentless
legal process overseen by the highest authorities of the Catholic Church,
their child was removed from their custody-never to be returned. 23 Edgardo was sent to be raised in an institution devoted to the conversion of
Jews and Muslims to Christianity-Rome's "House of the Catechumens"24
and was eventually "adopted" by Pope Pius IX himself.
The catalyst for the sudden and unheralded removal of young Edgardo from his parents' home lay in the unconfirmed tale of an illiterate
16. For discussion of contemporary child welfare history, see infra notes 119-

96 and accompanying text.
17. For discussion of the concerns over unfettered state authority, see infra

notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
18. See KERTZER, supra note 10, at 3 (recounting events of June 23, 1858, at
Mortara home).

19. See id. (describing police's return to Mortara home at which time they
entered and questioned Mortara parents).
20. See id. at 34 (discussing Mortaras' reaction to arrival of police).

21. See id. at 4 (detailing police's inquiry regarding Mortara children).
22. Id. at 5.
23. See id. at 11 (recounting seizure of Edgardo from his father's arms).
24. See Steven Lubet, Judicial Kidnapping, Then and Now: The Case of Edgardo
Mortara, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 961, 961-62 (1999) (book review) (introducing book
review with brief recounting of Mortara's story). The description of the Mortara
case in Part II is adapted from Steven Lubet's recent book review, JudicialKidnapping, Then and Now: The Case of EdgardoMortara,and is reprinted with permission of

the author. See id. at 961-63 (retelling Mortara's story from time of his baptism
until his death).
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Catholic housemaid named Anna Morisi. 25 It seems that about five years

before the arrival of the Papal police at the Mortaras' doorstep, the servant-herself then a child of only fourteen-had consulted with a neighborhood Catholic grocer about the ailing Edgardo, sharing her fear that
the boy might not recover from a childhood illness. 26 On the grocer's
advice, the servant had waited for a moment alone with the boy and then
sprinkled a bit of water on his brow while he slept, whispering "I baptize
you in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."27 This
act, it turns out, was sufficient under Canon law to constitute a baptism.
Thus, the sleeping Edgardo was instantly transformed into a Catholic, unbeknownst to him or his parents.
Edgardo recovered soon thereafter and Anna Morisi thought nothing
more of her action, reporting it to no one at the time.28 In the course of
the next few years, however, she mentioned the "baptism" in passing to at
least one friend, who repeated the story to others. 29 The information was
eventually relayed to Bologna's Inquisitor, who felt compelled under the
law to take action. 30 According to the Inquisitor, Father Pier Gaetano
Feletti, his duty had been made clear: "[T] he boy was a Catholic and could
31
not be raised in a Jewish household."
The Inquisitor's seizure of Edgardo Mortara eventually became an international cause celebre, drawing official government protests from France,
England and the United States. 32 Pope Pius IX, however, was unyielding.
He was unmoved by the anguished pleas of Edgardo's parents, and he
could not be swayed by the various forms of diplomatic pressure asserted
by more enlightened governments, much less by the increasingly barbed
attacks in the liberal press. 3 3 Having assumed personal responsibility for
25. See KERTZER, supranote 10, at 40-41 (giving reasons for Edgardo's removal
from family).
26. See id. at 40.
27. Id. (detailing nurse's story of her baptizing Mortara). The grocer later
claimed in sworn testimony that he could not possibly have given the advice attributed to him. See id. at 209-10.
28. See id. (noting that Anna "didn't think any more about" her actions).
29. See id. at 148 (explaining how Church learned of nurse's baptizing
Mortara).
30. See id. (examining how Church learned of incident).
31. Id. at 6.
32. See id. at 43 ("In the Italian peninsula, public protest was limited to Piedmont, for only there did Jews have basic constitutional rights, and these had been
granted only a decade before. But in France and Britain, not to mention the
United States, Jews were free to organize politically."). The Mortara incident triggered clerical and secular debate across the world. See id. at 85-90.
33. See id. at 84-85 (discussing Pope's refusal to return Edgardo Mortara to his
family). Professor Kertzer noted:
Throughout the controversy over the abduction, the Pope never wavered
in his belief in the righteousness of the cause he was championing. Everything we know about his worldview suggests that, unlike his Secretary of
State, Pius IX saw the decision to take Edgardo from hisJewish family as a
sacred obligation.
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the boy's Catholic upbringing and religious education, Pius IX came to

consider Edgardo's attachment to the church as a sign of God's continued
blessing of the Pope's temporal rule. 34 "My son," he once told Edgardo,
"you have cost me dearly, and I have suffered a great deal because of
you." 35 Then, speaking to others in attendance, the Pope added, "Both

the powerful and the powerless tried to steal this boy from me, and accused me of being barbarous and pitiless. They cried for his parents, but
36
they failed to recognize that I, too, am his father."
The story does not have a tidy ending. Edgardo was never returned to
his parents. He continued his religious education at the Vatican, eventually becoming a priest of some renown, taking the name Father Pio Edgardo in honor of Pius IX. 37 He remained completely estranged from his
family and from Judaism, to the point of fleeing Rome in disguise to avoid
the possibility of being returned to his parents during Garibaldi's overthrow of the Papal States. 38 In 1878, he met briefly with his then-widowed
mother, and thereafter remained in some contact with the other members
of his family. 39 In 1940, Father Pio Edgardo died in Belgium at age eightyeight. 40 David Kertzer reminds us in his comprehensive book, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara, that only one month later, "German soldiers
flooded Belgium, so to begin rounding up all those tainted with Jewish
blood."
III.

41

DUE PROCESS AND PARENS PA Tij: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE

The tensions reflected by the Mortara case are by no means unique to

19th Century Europe. Much of the developing law in the area of children's
rights is marked by the efforts of courts and legislators to balance principles of family autonomy against the State's responsibility to guard the welId.

34. See id. at 148 (examining how Church learned of incident).
35. Id. at 161.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 260 (discussing Edgardo Mortara's involvement with Church).
Professor Kertzer recounted Edgardo's adult life:
By the time he was thirteen, Edgardo had decided to devote his life to the

Church, and he became a novice in the order of the Canons Regular of
the Lateran, on his way to becoming a monk himself. He took the name
of Pio, honoring his new father and protector, Pius IX.
Id.
38. See id. at 264 (characterizing Mortara as "loath to see his father" and quoting Mortara's account of his escape).
39. See id. at 296 (describing Mortara's reunion with his mother and noting
"[f]rom that moment, Edgardo remained in touch with his family and, as he aged,
sought out family members when he found himself in Italy").
40. See id. at 298 ("On March 11, 1940, the 88-year-old monk died at the Belgian abbey in which he had lived for many years.").
41. Id.
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fare of its most vulnerable citizens. 42 In modern American society, the
rights of individual autonomy and self-determination are considered fundamental across the political spectrum. 43 In the context of family relations, principles of individual freedom have driven the development of
constitutional jurisprudence over the last seventy-five years, imposing the
protections of due process on the State's authority to take away parents'
44
presumed rights to decide how to raise their children.
In the area of family law, the line of modern cases establishing the
constitutional boundaries of family relations begins with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois. 45 Stanley involved a challenge
to the application of a statute presuming unmarried fathers to be unfit for
purposes of assigning custody to the state in a neglect, abuse or dependency case. 46 Mr. Stanley had lived out of wedlock with his children's
mother for many years, and when the mother died, the children were summarily removed from his custody and care pursuant to the challenged stat42. See generally Lisa A. Brunner, Circumventing the "Best Interests of the Child"
Standard: Child Custody Law in Missouri as Applied to Homosexual Parents,55 J. Mo. B.

200 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Supreme
Court stated:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Id.
44. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating Oregon statute requiring attendance at public
schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (striking down law prohibiting teaching of any
subject in any language other than English below eighth grade). The literature
charting the development of this history, beginning with the Supreme Court's decisions, is abundant. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, ParentalRights
vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 67-74 (1995) (exploring constitutional limitations on states'
authority to intervene in parent-child relationships); Bruce C. Hafen, Children'sLiberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their
"Rights", 1976 BYU L. REv. 605, 615-626 (1976) (discussing common law and constitutional backgrounds of parental rights).
Legal commentators generally now view Meyer, Pierce and their progeny as
standing for the values of pluralism, family autonomy and the right "to heed the
music of different drummers." See, e.g., LAURNCE H. TRIBE, AMERicA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-6, at 1319-21 (3d ed. 1999) (assessing legacy of Meyer and Pierce).
This view, however, is not universal. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who
Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv.
995, 997 (1992) (arguing that Meyer and Piercedecisions were motivated by "a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a class-stratified society, and to a

parent's private property rights in his children and their labor").
45. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
46. See id. at 646-47 (summarizing Stanley's claim and procedural history of
case).
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ute. 47 In ruling that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court
found that the existing relationship between Mr. Stanley and his children
warranted constitutional protection. 48 The Court held that because of the
compelling nature of the interests at stake in the parent-child relationship,
all parents "are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness
before their children can be removed from their custody."4 9 Although
Stanley does not explore the meaning of the term "fitness," the Court nevertheless makes it abundantly clear that this due process inquiry must encompass individualized consideration of the status and conduct of the
5°
parent in question.
Ten years after its decision in Stanley, the Supreme Court articulated
the substance of this due process right, in the context of proceedings to
terminate parental rights. 5 ' The Court established the minimum constitutional requisites necessary to permanently sever the legal relationship between a parent and a child in its 1982 landmark decision, Santosky v.
Kramer.52 Justice Blackmun's opinion describes a bifurcated test under
which a court must first focus on the fitness of the parent; only after the
parent has been found unfit, may a court consider what is in the best interest of the child. 53 The Court set a high standard for termination of paren47. See id. at 646 ('joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for 18
years, during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died, Peter
Stanley lost not only her but also his children.").
48. See id. at 651 (summarizing due process protections for parents and children and noting that "[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection").
49. Id. at 658 (establishing parents' entitlement to hearing and finding Stanley's denial of hearing "contrary to Equal Protection Clause").
50. See id. at 657-58 ("The State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de
minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists on presuming rather than
proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to
prove."). The Court in Stanley recognized that the protection of an individualized
hearing inures to the benefit not only of the parent, but also of the child:
"[W]hen, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent
and child." Id. at 657 (emphasis added). This language reflects the fact that while
threshold inquiries guarding against the disruption of family relationships may
compel a focus on the parent, the protections embodied by such procedural requirements safeguard the reciprocal interests that parents and children share in
preserving their relationships against undue interference.
51. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). The Court articulated the standard, "Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights
of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 747-48.
52. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
53. See id. at 760 ("But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and
his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship."). Similarly, in the context of child welfare proceedings, courts
must satisfy the threshold statutory requirement that the conduct of the parent has
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tal rights, requiring that the initial showing of unfitness must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. 54 In this initial stage of the factfinding
process, Justice Blackmun concluded that there is simply no room for consideration of the circumstances or the interests of the child, or of the relative merits of the claims of the individuals who are seeking to adopt the
child. 55 The protections of due process described in Santosky thus serve as
a check on the state's ability to impose its will on parents whose childrearing is at least minimally adequate, but whose choices may not be consistent
56
with prevailing societal norms.
Central to the Court's decision in Santosky is its view that any effort to
sever the parent-child relationship, as a constitutional matter, must begin
with an inquiry that is parent-focused. 5 7 Santosky thus stands for the critical principle that before the state may sanction interference in the relationship between a parent and a child, there must be some threshold
showing-independent of what may be in the best interest of the childthat the parent's conduct falls beneath some minimum acceptable
threshold.
The boundaries of the state's parens patriae authority described by
the Court in Santosky are mirrored in other areas. For example, provisions
been somehow deficient (i.e., that the child has been "abused" or "neglected"),
before it may make dispositional judgments about what is in the child's best interest. See, e.g., N.Y. FAm. LAw §§ 614, 622 (McKinney 1999) (providing subject matter of fact-finding hearing prior to dispositional hearing).
54. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 (imposing "clear and convincing evidence"
standard of proof).
55. See id. at 759-60 (explaining content and purpose of factfinding hearing).
The Court elaborated:
The factfinding does not purport-and is not intended-to balance the
child's interest in a normal family home against the parents' interest in
raising the child. Nor does it purport to determine whether the natural
parents or the foster parents would provide the better home. Rather, the
factfinding hearing pits the State directly against the parents. The State
alleges that the natural parents are at fault. The questions disputed and
decided are what the State did-"made diligent efforts", - and what the
natural parents did not do-"maintain contact with or plan for the future
of the child."
Id. (citations omitted).
56. Although Santosky may stand as the most significant procedural safeguard
for parents threatened with the loss of their children, the Supreme Court has acknowledged other important procedural rights of similar significance. See, e.g., See
M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding that indigent parent challenging termination of parental rights was entitled by Fourteenth Amendment to free
trial transcripts); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (stating that due process may in some circumstances require appointment of counsel
for indigent parent facing termination of parental rights).
57. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 ("[P]arents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.").
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of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") 58 limit the filing of
an action for custody by a nonparent to circumstances in which the child
is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. In many jurisdictions,
courts have narrowly construed the meaning of the term "physical custody" to require that the applicant for custody have not only physical control of the child, but also the parent's agreement to relinquish custodial
responsibility. 59 Other jurisdictions have required that third-party custody
applicants must have had physical responsibility for a child for a minimum
60
period of time before they may claim standing to file for legal custody.
Whatever their specific boundaries may be, limitations on the right of a
third party to apply for custody protect fit parents and their children from
being subjected to hearings on applications for custody by individuals with
61
only casual contact with or limited responsibility for the child.
Both the constitutional due process requirements described in
Santosky and the standing requirements of state custody law derive from
the same theories of rights-based liberalism. 62 According to these theories, limits on the authority of the state serve in essence to insulate families
58. Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act, § 401(d), 9A U.L.A. 263-64 (1998)
("UMDA"). The Act states:
A child custody proceeding is commenced in the [-] court: . ...
(2) by a
person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in
the [county, judicial district] in which he is permanently resident or
found, but only if he is not in the physical custody of one of his parents.
Id. For examples of states that have adopted the exact language or language substantially similar to the UMDA, see, e.g., ARz. REv. STAT. § 25-401 (1998); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(b) (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2) (West
1999).
59. See, e.g., In re Petition of Otakar Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 335 (I11.
1995)
("The determination that a parent does not have physical custody of a child turns
not on possession; rather, it requires that that parent somehow has voluntaily and
indefinitely relinquished custody of the child.").
60. See, e.g.,
COLO. REv. STAT. §14-10-123(1)(c) (granting standing to file action for legal custody to persons who have had physical care of child for six months
or more).
61. See In re Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (I11.
1986) ("[T]he standing
requirement... should not turn on who is in physical possession, so to speak, of
the child at the moment of filing the petition for custody. To hold differently
would be to encourage abductions of minors in order to satisfy the literal terms of
the standing requirement. .

.

. "); Henderson v. Henderson, 568 P.2d 177, 179

(Mont. 1977) (defining "physical custody"). The court elaborated:
"Physical custody" is not limited to having actual, immediate control of
the physical presence of the child. Rather, this phrase relates to the custodial rights involved in the care and control of the child. To interpret
this phrase otherwise would allow a nonparent to file a petition for custody anytime the child is out of the physical presence of the parent or
parents, even if for a few minutes, or under the watchful eyes of an authorized babysitter....
Id.
62. See generally Melinda A. Roberts, Parentand Child in Conflict: Between Liberty
and Responsibility, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 485, 505-14 (1996)
(discussing work ofJohn Locke andJohn Stuart Mill and application of traditional
liberal theory to children's law).
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from unnecessary or inappropriate interference with their right to selfgovernance. 63 Whether constitutional or statutory, the purpose of such
threshold requirements, in simple terms, is to ensure that children are not
arbitrarily separated from their families for reasons that have more to do
with the racial, religious or cultural preferences of the decisionmaker than
64
with legitimate concerns for the protection of the child.
Once these threshold requirements have been satisfied, consistent
with the constitutional protections derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, courts that address the welfare or disposition of children are bound

to serve the best interest of the child. The meaning of this term has been
subject to considerable debate-a seemingly inescapable consequence of
its amorphous nature. 6 5 Many commentators have explored the pitfalls
associated with an indeterminate and vaguely defined standard, raising
questions about the dangers of value-laden judgments of decisionmakers
63. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 44, at 628-41 (discussing protections against
abuse and other forms of parental unfitness within family tradition); see also Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 335 ("It is this standing requirement that ensures that the superior right of natural parents to the care and custody of their children is
safeguarded."). For examples of the burgeoning literature exploring and challenging the application of liberal theory to children's rights, see Wendy Anton
Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36
ARiz. L. REv. 11, 20 (1994) (demonstrating how both constitutional law and family
law jurisprudence exclude children's personhood); Roberts, supra note 62, at 486
(suggesting that "children have rights of liberty so long as our recognition of those
rights is consistent with the various responsibilities and duties we as a community
have to protect the well-being of children and to promote their interests"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1749 (1993) (exploring "ways in which legal
norms of family and fathering currently fail children").
64. See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 781 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("[R]ace per se
can never amount to sufficient harm to justify a constitutional termination ..
").
In Roe, a federal district court found unconstitutionally vague a state statute that
permitted the removal of a child from his mother for "neglect," based solely on the
fact that the child's mother was living with a man of a different race. See id. at 779.
Numerous commentators have explored the risks inherent in indeterminate standards that permit the separation of children and parents for reasons grounded in
the personal biases of the decision makers. See, e.g., LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY 48-53 (1989) (explaining process and effects of child removal);
Fitzgerald, supra note 63, at 53-64 (asessing "best interests" standard); Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication:Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226, 268-77 (Summer 1975) (discussing four reasons why
indeterminate standard and broad judicial discretion adversely affect children);
Nannette Schorr, Foster Care and the Politics of Compassion, TiKUN, May-June 1992,
at 19 ("[Once having identified the primary problem as bad parenting, the state is
free to intervene without restraint in its clients' daily lives by removing children
from their parents with minimal investigation and little respect for legal
procedures. ..

").

65. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 44, at 66 (criticizing best interest standard
for failure to provide guidance and for producing arbitrary results); Andrew S.
Rosenman, Note, Babies Jessica, Richard and Emily: The Need for Legislative Reform of
Adoption Laws, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1851, 1876 (1995) (labeling best interest standard as "amorphous concept" that should not be applied until after finding of
questionable relationship between parent and child).
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who may not share or even understand the ethnic, cultural or economic
background of the children whose futures they judge. 6 6 Yet, in some respects, the indeterminacy that has been at the heart of much of this criticism is also what lends the concept its strength. Once a court has been
properly charged with responsibility for determining the disposition of a
child's future, it must retain the flexibility to respond to the child's individual circumstances. Whether legislative or judicial in origin, efforts to
capture the essence of "best interest" in a finite series of criteria can only
contribute to the categorical treatment of children, leading ultimately to a
reduction in the ability of individual judges to meet the fluid and evolving
needs of their wards. For this reason, despite its flaws, the concept of best
interest must continue to inform custody, child protection and other legal
proceedings in which children's futures are weighed.
Although the best interest standard will no doubt continue to play an
important role in judicial decisionmaking, its use as a threshold device for
regulating judicial intervention raises a distinct set of concerns. Increasingly, however, commentators have argued that the notion of best interest
should serve not only as an aspirational goal, but also as a legal standard
governing judgments about when the state should be permitted to interfere with the relationship between a parent and a child. 6 7 Driven by a
series of high-profile cases, critics of uncompromising due process have
attacked standing and other threshold limits on the court's power to intervene as overly protective of "parents' rights." 68 Arguments for restructur66. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 44, at 66 ("[S] uch ambiguity will have the
greatest impact on the least visible and respected population of families whose
racial and economic status already place them at great risk of destructive state
intervention.").
67. See Mnookin, supra note 64, at 227-28 (advocating use of less discretionary
standard that focuses on needs of child rather than parents).
68. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption
Act, the Deboer-Schmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 15, 37-38 (1996) (stating that courts should rethink constitutional and policy reasons behind preference for rights of parents over rights of
children). Most notable among these are three cases. First, is the Gregory K. case,
which involved a Florida boy who with the help of his foster parent sought to establish an independent right to bring an action to sever his relationship with his natural parents. See id. at 37 (discussing standing of 12-year-old boy to bring suit against
his natural parents to terminate their parental rights). The "Baby Jessica" and
"Baby Richard" cases also involved children separated from their custodial parents
and returned to their natural parents. Both children, in the wake of failed adoptions, were compelled to leave behind the adults who nurtured them through their
early years and to return to natural parents who were virtual strangers. See id. at 1516 n.2 (discussing court decisions to return BabyJessica and Baby Richard to natural fathers). The latter two cases, in particular, have spawned a wealth of commentary arguing for changes in the laws that denied these children the ability to
remain with the adults they knew as parents. See Roberts, supra note 62, at 526-41
(discussing facts of Baby Richard case). See generally Hollinger, supra note 68, at 1516 nn.1, 2 (citing Baby Richard and BabyJessica as part of series of cases in which
legal system has been slow or unable to resolve conflicting claims, generating "yet
more media attention to the questions of 'where do children belong?' and 'to
whom do children belong?"'); Suellyn Scarnecchia, Imagining Children's Rights, 12
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ing the role of the courts to make them more responsive to the needs of
children have come from all quarters, including judges, legislators and
legal scholars. 69 Some legal commentators have challenged the application to children's law of the liberal rights-based theories that form the
foundation for the Supreme Court's decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,70 Pierce
v. Society of Sisters 71 and their progeny. 72 Others have focused more practically on the definitions of "family" and of who constitutes a "parent" entitled to the protections of due process. 73 Much of the more provocative
literature in this field seeks to expand the definition of "parent" to accommodate within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
protections the psychological equivalents of parent-child relationships that
develop when children are raised by adults to whom they are not biologi74
cally related.
Proposed reforms promoting legal protection for these kinds of relational interests have arisen largely in response to cases in which children
have been abruptly and traumatically removed from non-biological families. Reactions to the now infamous case of the boy known popularly as
"Baby Richard" are emblematic of the increasing pressure on the due proT.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1995) (telling stories of BabyJessica and Baby Richard
and noting "failure by the court to recognize the child as an individual person who
has feelings, who can be hurt and hurt badly"); Rosenman, supranote 65, at 1851
("Along with Baby Jessica, the recent case[ ] of Baby Richard ... illustrate[s] the
need for immediate legislative reform of state adoption laws.").
69. See, e.g., Rosenman, supra note 65, at 1876-94 (discussing reforms that
would further best interests of children).
70. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
71. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
72. SeeJames Dwyer, Parents'Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents'Rights,82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1376 (1994) ("Finally, the elimination
of parental rights would not entail the 'liberation' of children from all parental
governance and discipline."); Fitzgerald, supra note 63, at 99-111 (utilizing "legal
history of women's property rights" to develop structure for valuing children's perspectives); Roberts, supra note 62, at 514-26 (discussing reasons to limit children's
right of liberty); Woodhouse, supra note 44, at 997 (arguing that foundation for
Meyer and Pierce is theory of children as property).
73. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REv. 879, 944-51 (1984) (advocating legal recognition of child-parent relationships
arising outside nuclear family); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483-90 (1990) (discussing need to "develop a
new definition of legal parent to solve" uncertainties in cases where family does
not fit traditional "one-mother/one-father" model); Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's
Right to Protectionfrom Transfer Trauma in a Contested Adoption Case, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL. 41, 53 (1995) ("This Court must recognize that a child faced with
the imminent loss of everyone he knows is a person with due process rights.");
Woodhouse, supra note 44, at 1761-67 (discussing supportive role of partners and
extended family in childrearing).
74. See Polikoff, supra note 73, at 483-90 (suggesting three theories for redefinition of parent: equitable parenthood, child-parent relationship standard and
nonexclusive parenthood).
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cess safeguards grounded in Meyer, Pierce, Santosky and related cases. Richard was the subject of an adoption petition filed by a couple who obtained
custody of the boy through the consent of his mother. 75 Before his birth,
Richard's parents had temporarily separated. 76 Consequently, Richard's
birth and his placement for adoption were concealed from his father, as a
result of both the mother's refusal to cooperate with efforts to notify the
father and affirmative misrepresentations to the court by the adoptive parents and their lawyer about the father's status. 77 The adoption petition
was grounded in the charge that the father, a Czech immigrant named
Otakar Kirchner, was unfit as a consequence of his failure to demonstrate
a reasonable degree of interest in the child during the first thirty days after
the child's birth-a charge that was patently inconsistent with Mr. Kirchner's unrebutted testimony about his unsuccessful efforts to locate the boy
in the weeks after the child's expected due date. 78 By the time the trial
was concluded, the boy had been with his putative adoptive parents for
more than a year. Mindful of both the boy's best interest and his obligations under state and federal law (if not the facts of the case), the trial
79
judge found that the father was, indeed, unfit.
By the time the Illinois Appellate Court reviewed the case, the boy was
nearly two-and-a-half years old and still living with his putative adoptive
parents. Clearly affected by the unhappy prospect of moving Richard
from his settled home, the court affirmed the finding of unfitness and the
consequent adoption. 80 In doing so, however, the court dramatically departed from the dictates of Santosky, concluding that termination of a parent's rights could be supported by a finding that adoption was in the best
interest of a child, even in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness:
[A]fter a newborn child has been placed for adoption and lives
continuously thereafter for longer than 18 months with his
adopting parents who adopt or have adopted him pursuant to a
judgment of adoption, it would be contrary to the best interest of
75. See Bob Greene, Who Will Hear the Child's Cry, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1993, at
C1 (stating facts of case); see also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (I11.1994) (same).
76. See In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182 (stating that biological mother separated
from biological father after hearing allegations of his affair with another woman).
77. See id. at 187 (McMorrow, J., concurring) (stating that adoptive parents
knew of biological mother's active misrepresentation to biological father and "ac-

quiesced in the biological mother's scheme").
78. See id. at 186-87 (McMorrow,J., concurring) (discussing biological father's
actions to "locate and establish contact with the child").

79. See id. at 182 (discussing holding of trial court); see also In re Syck, 562
N.E.2d 174, 183-84 (Ill. 1990) (discussing judicial interpretations of statutory obligations). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Santosky, the Illinois Supreme
Court acknowledged its constitutional obligation to follow the bifurcated test for
termination of parental rights described by Justice Blackmun. See Syck, 562 N.E.2d
at 183 (stating that parent must be determined unfit before court may consider
best interest of the child).

80. See In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 654 (Ill. App. 1993) (discussing reasons
biological father not fit parent), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (IlL. 1994).
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the child to remove him from his home and family by disturbing
81
the judgment of adoption.
Although the court's view about the importance of protecting children's interests is unremarkable, the same cannot be said for its willingness to dispense with the requirements of due process imposed by
Santosky.82 The appellate court's radical departure from established law
was ultimately reversed on appeal, but the cause of the adoptive parents

generated a flood of public support for the boy's plight. 8 3 To most observers of the case, Mr. Kirchner's efforts were cruel and heartless, an attempt
to sever Richard's loving connection to the only family he had ever known.
Critics castigated the Illinois Supreme Court for failing to consider Richard's best interest, which they believed was best served by leaving him in
the care of his adoptive parents.84 There were repeated calls for a best
interest hearing, in which predictions of the child's future happiness
would outweigh assertions of parental rights. The ruling generated questions on the part of many journalists, lawyers and judges "because it was
decided on the basis of the rights of the adults involved and without taking
into account the 'best interests' of the child."85 One highly respected
legal commentator observed:
No state should be allowed to deny a child the love and support
and affection of his parents without even considering the child's
interests. That is what the Illinois Supreme Court did. It held
that a father had a right to be with his child but ignored the
86
rights of a child to be with his [adoptive] parents.

81. Id. at 653. The majority distinguished the Syck precedent because, unlike
this case, Syck did not involve a judgment of adoption. See id. at 652 n.2.
82. See id. at 652 ("If there is a conflict between Richard's best interest and the

rights and interests of his parents, whomever they may be, the rights and interests
of the parents must yield and allow the best interest of Richard to pass through
and prevail. This tenet allows for no exception."). The court expressed the view
that in any situation in which the interests of a child are at odds with those of his or
her parents, the child's interests must take precedence. See id.
83. See In re Doe, 638 N.E. 2d at 182 (criticizing appellate court for "wholly

missing the threshold issue"). Co-author Bruce Boyer submitted an amicus curiae
brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing that the termination of the father's
parental rights was inappropriate and that the Appellate Court's disregard of the
requirements of Santosky was contrary to both law and public policy. He subsequently appeared for Mr. Kirchner in the United States Supreme Court in opposition to petitions for certiorari.
84. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Custody Ruling Stands: No Words Barred as
Edgar and Heiple TradeJabs on "Richard,"CHx. TRx., July 13, 1994, at Ni (criticizing
decision as "tragic").
85. Darryl Van Duch, Adoption Case Sparks Press-JudiciaryFeud, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
4, 1996, at A10.
86. Susan Estrich, What About Child's Interests?, USA TODAY, July 21, 1994, at
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This view was shared by Illinois Supreme Court Justice Mary Ann McMorrow, who wrote a powerful dissent to the Court's order that Richard
be "delivered to his father, Otakar Kirchner."8 7 Although she had initially
voted to overturn the boy's adoption, Justice McMorrow later assailed her
colleagues for their "total failure to recognize the rights of the child"8 8
and for their refusal to grant Richard "an evidentiary hearing to determine what is in his best interests."8 9
This rising tide of public opinion did not go unheard in the Illinois
Legislature. In the days immediately following the Illinois Supreme
Court's reversal of Richard's adoption, a hastily constructed coalition of
advocates and legislators conceived, drafted and passed curative legislation
that came to be known as the "Baby Richard" law. 90 The legislation was
designed to overcome the standing limits that would otherwise preclude
Richard's adoptive parents from requesting a hearing to determine the
boy's custody following the vacation of his adoption. 9 1 Legislators were
spurred to act before the Illinois Supreme Court denied the then-pending
motion for reconsideration, out of the hope that they might thereby successfully defeat arguments against the legislation's retroactive application
to Richard.9 2 Although this effort ultimately proved unavailing for Richard, GovernorJames Edgar signed the resulting bill into law a mere seven93
teen days after the Illinois Supreme Court's initial decision in the case.
Like much of the related legal commentary, the Illinois Legislature,
in its haste, failed to grapple in any significant way with the consequences
of supplanting existing due process safeguards against unwarranted judicial intervention with more open-ended tests based on relational interests.
Indeed, best interest hearings are notoriously prone to a narrow focus on
87. In re Petition of Otakar Kirchner, 639 N.E.2d 324, 340 (Ill. 1995).
88. Id. at 343 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (McMorrowJ., dissenting). Illinois GovernorJim Edgar took the same
position, stating it even more bluntly:
[The case] is about a young boy whom the court has decreed should be
brutally, tragically torn away from the only parents he has ever knownparents who by all accounts loved and nurtured him from the second he
joined their family ....

This young child should have found a cham-

pion-a protector-in the highest court of the state. Instead, he found
justices who betrayed their obligations to him and to the people who
placed them in their lofty positions.
Greenburg, supra note 84, at NI.
90. See Rosenman, supra note 65, at 1874 (discussing amendment requiring
best interest hearing after adoption is vacated).
91. See Illinois Public Act 88-550 Art. 9 § 975, (amending Illinois Adoption
Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/20 (West 1994)) (stating that court shall
"promptly conduct a hearing" after order for adoption is vacated).
92. See id. (providing that statute applies to all cases pending on or after July
3, 1994).
93. See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ill. 1995) (refusing to apply
amendment to further proceedings in Baby Richard case).
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the child's current attachments. 9 4 To the extent that this is true, the claim
that a person has developed a parent-like attachment with a child would
likely rest on much of the same proof as would the same individual's claim

for custody. Consequently, in a contested third-party custody dispute, one
might reasonably expect that a threshold hearing to evaluate whether the
third-party claimant has standing as a "psychological parent" would be difficult to distinguish from the custody hearing itself. If so, then the price of
developing open-ended gatekeeping standards that are more responsive to
the individual circumstances of the child must be the sacrifice, at some

level, of the protections that shield fit parents and their families from the
taxing burden of judicial intervention. Any measure of the extent of this
burden must account for the kinds of concerns raised when the intervention of the state-however benevolent it may be-is colored by the cul-

tural and religious biases that resulted in the Papal adoption of Edgardo
Mortara.

IV.

FAMILY VERSUS STATE:

THE FIGHT FOR EDGARDO MORTARA

With the twin themes of procedural due process and parens patriae as
a backdrop, we turn again to the story of Edgardo's kidnapping, to consider how effectively the procedural protections afforded to the boy's parents guarded against cultural and religious biases. 95 In one sense, the
events surrounding Edgardo Mortara's removal from his family are almost
unfathomable to modern Americans. Under no conception of the First
Amendment, from extreme right to extreme left, could a child be forcibly
taken away from his biological parents solely on the basis of their religion. 96 The very thought is offensive, evoking (with good cause) images
of the other theocratic persecutions from which the Establishment Clause
is intended to protect our citizens. Viewed strictly as a matter of religious
coercion, then, it is safe to assume that the Mortara case is of historical
interest only. Nothing like that could happen here, and if it did, we can
be confident that the courts would quickly correct the abuse.
94. See Rosenman, supra note 65, at 1875 (noting subjective nature of inquiring into child's best interests); see alsoJennifer Ann Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the
Children: Court Considerationof Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1609,
1618 (1998) (discussing numerous attachment factors that court can consider in
best interest standard, such as parent-child bond and playing with child).
95. For discussion of the 19th Century case of Edgardo Mortara, see supra
notes 20-41 and accompanying text. Part IV of this Article appeared in substantial
part in a book review written by co-author Steven Lubet, and it is reprinted with
the permission of its author. See Steven Lubet, JudicialKidnapping, Then and Now:
The Case of Edgardo Mortara,93 Nw. L. REv. 961 (1999).
96. See, e.g., Drobac, supra note 94, at 1642-46 (proposing bifurcated framework for courts considering role of religion in child custody cases). To be sure,
religion may and frequently does factor in to the resolution of disputes between
parents over the custody of their children, in ways both permissible and impermissible under the Constitution. See id.
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But the Mortara case was not exclusively about religion. The religious
authority of the Papacy in the mid-19th Century was inextricably bound up
with its temporal powers, and with its rights and duties as parens patriae.
The story of young Edgardo's kidnapping thus speaks as well to the manner in which Papal authorities exercised their responsibility as the ultimate
protector of the citizens of the Italian state. As Kertzer's narrative so ably
illustrates, it is beyond question that the intentions of the Pope and his
emissaries were benevolent; Pope Pius IX and others within the Papal hierarchy believed fervently in the rightness of their actions in wresting Edgardo from his family. They measured the value of their service to the boy
not only against their religious convictions, but also by the opportunities
they felt they were creating for a child who would otherwise have been
raised by a demeaned and persecuted social minority. Throughout the
years of Momolo Mortara's efforts to free his son from the control of the
Papacy, state authorities remained firm in their professed commitment to
the boy's welfare.
Moreover, in the face of growing international criticism, the same authorities took refuge in the assurances that they had offered to the
Mortara family every available legal recourse. With the benefit of more
than a century of perspective, it may seem difficult to reconcile the
Church's treatment of Edgardo with legitimate State objectives. 9 7 But lawyers are trained to look for both sides of every story, and one cannot help
but observe the procedural regularity with which the matter went forward.
From the standpoint of the Church, which is to say the Papal government and its agents, the removal of Edgardo was not a kidnapping at all.
Rather, they regarded the events as profoundly "lawful," attended by rigorous safeguards and carried out with scrupulous concern for the rights, and
even the sensitivities, of everyone involved. It seems clear that the officers
of the Inquisition did not react rashly or hastily to the news of Edgardo's
covert baptism. The only witness to the event, Anna Morisi, was brought
before the Inquisitor, Father Feletti, pursuant to a written summons. She
98
was placed under oath prior to her interrogation, which was transcribed.
Approximately six months passed before the Inquisitor ordered the gendarmes to remove Edgardo from his parents, 99 during which time the Inquisitor consulted with his superiors in Rome, in order to be certain that
everything was done "punctiliously according to the sacred Canons."100
97. David Kertzer repeatedly refers to the boys "kidnapping." See Lubet, supra
note 24, at 964. Other sources are in accord. The EncyclopediaJudaica,for example, uses the term "abduction" three times in the single paragraph it devotes to the
case. See 12 ENCYCLOPEMAJUDAICA (1972).
98. See Kertzer, supra note 10, at 83-84 (noting that Anna Morisi was summoned before Inquisitor to be interrogated and that her testimony was
transcribed).
99. See id. at 207.

100. Id. at 6.
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Following Edgardo's remand to the custody of the Papacy, the
Mortaras embarked on an extended campaign of petitions and appeals.
The Mortaras quickly began assembling evidence in support of their
cause, much of it directed at a legal technicality. It seems that, absent
parental consent, Catholics were allowed to baptize Jewish children only if
there was strong reason to believe that the child was about to die. "In such
a case, canon law held, the importance of allowing a soul to go to heaven
outweighed the customary commitment to parental (and especially pater01
nal) authority over children."'
Thus, the Mortaras and their supporters collected a series of affidavits
and depositions designed to show that Edgardo had never been deathly ill,
and certainly not at the time he was allegedly baptized by Morisi. By attacking the legal validity of the baptism, they hoped to undo its effect and
win the return of their son.
After several meetings with church officials, including Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, the Vatican Secretary of State, the Mortaras prepared a
formal legal brief for the Pope's consideration. The document, which appeared to have been drafted with the assistance of a canon lawyer, perhaps
even a priest, was styled a "Pro-memoria and Syllabus."' 0 2 The Promemoria included the facts of the case and a seven page section, written in
Latin, citing the works of various church authorities in support of the
Mortaras' plea. Another section, in Italian, listed similar instances in
which baptized children had been allowed to remain with theirJewish parents. 10 3 The main document in the appeal was the Syllabus, a fifty page
brief, written in Latin, that rested on citation and interpretation of ecclesiastical legal sources and detailed references to prior cases of forced
04
baptism.'
Pope Pius IX might have simply ignored the Mortaras document, but
instead he directed his legal advisors to prepare a response, also based on
Church law. The result was a thirty-four page document titled Brevi
cenni-"A brief explanation and reflections on the pro-memoria and syllabus humbly presented to His Holiness, Pope Pius IX, concerning the baptism conferred in Bologna on the child Edgardo, son of the Jews
05
Salomone and Marianna Mortara."'
Although dismissive of the Mortaras claims, Brevi cenni refuted their
arguments point by point in a clear effort to demonstrate the legality of
the child's removal by the Papal authorities. It listed five conclusions, refuting the five major points of the appeal, and it distinguished each of the
101. Id. at 97.
102. Id. at 144.
103. See id. at 144. It appears that the Mortaras were arguing in the alternative. First, the baptism was invalid; but even if valid, Edgardo should be restored to
their custody. See id.
104. See id. at 145-46 (detailing Context of Syllabus showing why Edgardo's
return to his family was warrante dunder Church dogma).
105. Id. at 146.
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prior cases relied upon by the Mortaras. 10 6 Although the Pope certainly
owed no response to the Mortaras, the length and detail of Brevi cenni
clearly indicates the perceived importance of legality. The document was,
in fact, distributed to Papal representatives and ambassadors throughout
Europe and Latin America, as evidence that the Church had acted in fair0 7
ness and justice.
All of which brings us to the subject of Edgardo's welfare. From the
first moment that the case came to the attention of the Inquisitor, Papal
authorities firmly believed that they were acting in furtherance of Edgardo's obvious best interest. Having been made a Christian, even an unconscious one, it seemed obvious to everyone in the Church-from the
Pope to the police marshal-that nothing but harm could come to Edgardo if he remained in the custody of his infidel parents. The boy had to
be removed for his own safety, quickly and completely.
In defending the Church's abduction of Edgardo Mortara, the Jesuit
journal Civilte Catolicaoffered a succinct justification for removing the boy
from his family:
If nature gives the father full responsibility for the care of his own
son, it is not so the father can do as he pleases, but so that the
son's interests can be protected. How can anyone think that
such authority should be left to the father when "it is almost certain that it will be for the son's good but rather for his supreme
ruination?... Does not civil law provide that one should take a
child away from a cruel and murderous father in order to protect
his life? And why, then should it be unjust for someone's eternal
life that which seems so just when it concerns his temporal
existence?' 08
Put in this way, the position of the Church seems straightforward and
readily defensible. How could any thinking citizen resist the effort of the
State to protect a child so clearly at risk of serious and avoidable harm? If
the object of the State, in fashioning rules of process, is to guard against
undeniable and remediable harm, it seems there is little room to question
the underlying rationale supporting State intervention, against the interests and "rights" of the offending parents.
But clearly, the reactions naturally evoked by the retelling of Edgardo's story suggest that there is more to understanding the legitimacy of
the state's actions than simply acknowledging the theoretical basis of its
powers as parens patriae. Ultimately, the legitimacy of its intervention in
Edgardo's case must rest on an understanding of what exactly was the nature of the interests the Church sought to protect, and how this interest
balanced against the "rights" of the boy's family.
106. See id. at 149-50.

107. See id. at 146.
108. Id. at 115.
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With the passage of time, it surely became easier to defend Edgardo's
continuing residence in the Catholic community with increasing confidence. By the time he furtively passed by his unsuspecting father in the
Rome train station-as Garibaldi's forces moved in to Rome to wrest control of the city from Papal authorities-Edgardo, at age nineteen, had
long since lost any desire to re-establish contact with his Jewish family. 10 9
His dialog with the King's emissary to Rome, seeking to avoid being
turned over to his parents by the police, reflects not only his desire to
assert his own autonomy, but also the distance he had traveled in the
twelve years since being removed from his family.11 0
But what of the defense of the Church in the immediate wake of the
abduction? Then, of course, Edgardo had no relationship with the Catholic Church whatsoever. Yet the rhetoric of the Pope's supporters was no
less forceful or adamant about the rightness of the Church's actions, even
long before the boy had a chance to grow accustomed to life as a Catholic
initiate. Defenders of Edgardo's abduction pointed to the boy's nearly
instantaneous attraction to the Catholic faith. For example, Kertzer recounts a passage from one of the most prominent church-linked papers in
Italy at the time, L'Armonia della religione civiltd, which published a story
titled, News of the Young Christian Mortara. The paper described the boy's

miraculous transformation to Christianity:
[Edgardo] had entered the Catechumens with a single idea 'already stamped on his forehead, and even more in his heart-the
great benefit for him of being Christian, the singular grace that
he had received through Baptism and, by contrast, the immense
misfortune for his parents of being and wanting to remain
1 11
Jews.
To make the story more palatable, the Catholic press dismissed the
obvious anguish and protestations of Momolo and Marianna Mortara as
resulting not from the loss of their son, but rather from their "hostility
109. See id. at 264. Indeed, one (perhaps overly dramatized) account describes an encounter between Edgardo and his brother Riccardo, who entered
Rome in 1870 wearing the uniform of the nationalist Italian army, reflected how
deeply entrenched his loyalty to the Pope had become:
[Edgardo], dressed in a 19-year-old initiate's robes, placed one hand over
his eyes to shield them from the sacrilegious sight and raised the other in
front of him, signaling Riccardo to stop where he was. 'Get back, Satan!'
Edgardo shouted. But, the crestfallen Riccardo replied, 'I am your
brother.' To this Edgardo responded, 'Before you get any closer to me,
take of that assassin's uniform.
Id. at 263.
110. See id. at 265. The arguments that must have been made in defense of
Edgardo's preservation of connections fashioned over more than a decade under
the protective arm of the House of Catechumens will no doubt seem familiar to
contemporary scholars who have advocated for greater legal protection of children's existing psychological attachments. See id. at 266-71.
111. Id. at 69.
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toward the church." 1 12 The importance of Edgardo's rapid integration
into the Catholic Church was obviously central to the case made by the
Church's defenders.
In fact, the claims of Edgardo's miraculous and sudden attachment to
the Catholic church-beginning in the carriage that transported the boy
from Bologne to Rome-explain little. 113 Not only were these claims
hotly disputed by Edgardo's family, 114 but they were (as Professor Kertzer
notes) on their face incredible. 115 More telling are the comments of the
Genoa newspaper I1Cattolico, which reflect the extent to which negative
stereotypes ofJewish faith and culture drove andjustified the abduction of
young Edgardo:
Whoever among us gives a little serious thought to the matter,
compares the condition of the Jew-without a true Church, without a King, and without a country, dispersed and always a foreigner wherever he lives on the face of the earth, and moreover,
infamous for the ugly stain with which the killers of Christ are
marked-[whoever] compares this reviled man with a Roman citizen, who has as his country the most civil nation in the world,
Italy, and who can occupy the most splendid civil and ecclesiastical offices of the eternal city, will immediately understand how
great is this temporal advantage that the Pope is obtaining for
the Mortara boy.116
The theme of religious persecution was of course central to the lives
ofJews in 19th Century Italy. In the tumultuous days of the risorgimento,as
Italian nationalists sought to wrest control of civil affairs from Pope Pius
IX, protecting the rights of the oppressed Jewish minority was assuredly
not a matter of utmost importance to the beleaguered papacy. In the Italian states of the mid-19th Century, following several hundred years of religious oppression, confinement to ghettoes and deprivation of basic
human rights, Jews certainly had little reason to expect respectful or evenhanded treatment of their family relations at the hands of the ruling Catholic authorities.
This history sheds considerable light on the forces that led the Inquisitor of Bologna to act upon a third-hand account of an illiterate teenager's
baptism of a Jewish infant. Once the children of infidels had experienced
112. Id. at 114.
113. See id. at 51. In the Church narrative, according to Professor Kertzer,
during his trip to Rome, Edgardo almost immediately began to demonstrate an
acute interest in the subject of the Christian religion, asking repeatedly to be taken
to visit church whenever his carriage stopped in a new town (see id. at 51-52), such
that his trip "began to take on the mythic quality of a voyage from error to enlightenment." Id. at 51.
114. See id. at 52-53.
115. See id. at 70 (noting European liberals' view of Church's story as absurd).
116. Id. at 135.
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the blessings of Christianity, it was the Church's duty to "protect in them
the sanctity of what they have received, and to nourish them for eternal
life." 1 17 First and foremost, Catholic authorities were concerned for Edg18
might easily discount
ardo's immortal soul. While the "worldly wise"'
this motive, there can be no doubt that the Church officials firmly and
sincerely believed that they were acting with Edgardo's ultimate happiness
in mind. They did not seize the boy for the conscious purpose of tormenting his parents, or even to coerce the Jewish community generally.
The Church had no particular animus toward the Mortaras and it did not
make a general practice of depriving Jewish parents of their children.
Rather, the entire impulse was protective-Edgardo's interest in salvation
119
That is why Pope
simply outweighed his parents' interest in custody.
Pius IX always replied non possimus-impossible!-when he was petitioned
for Edgardo's return.
It may say little for the Church that its position in the Mortara case
appears beneficent only in comparison to the later atrocities of the Nazis.
Still, it is impossible-non possimus!-to deny that the Pope and his agents,
even the Inquisitor, were impelled in their actions by both the law and
their own good intentions. Yet this combination of strict legality and determined benevolence makes the Mortara case, if anything, even more
troublesome than if it had been merely a hateful abduction. More troubling because it is suddenly more relevant than we might have thought to
contemporary juvenile law. And it is to those implications that we now
turn.

V.

LESSONS OF THE MORTARA CASE IN MODERN CHILD WELFARE

The Mortara case offers strong evidence that the benevolence of state
actors can be insufficient to guard against undue interference with family
relations. Yet one need not delve so deeply into history for evidence of the
risks attendant upon unchecked state authority over family affairs. What
follows is a discussion of four more recent chapters in the realm of child
welfare, each of which suggests similar cautions about undue reliance on
the belief that even the most well-meaning state actors can be trusted completely to further the "best interests" of our children.

117. Id. at 149.
118. See Clay Chandler, Scalia's Religion Remarks: Just a Matter of Free Speech?,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 15, 1996, at F7 (reporting Justice Antonin Scalia's acerbic observation that the "worldly wise" consider basic tenets of Christianity to be "absurd"
and "simple-minded"); see also Steven Lubet, Judicial Independence and Independent
Judges, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 745, 749 (1997) (defendingJustice Scalia from criticism
that his remarks were improper for judge).
119. See Kertzer, supra note 14 , at 149 (listing reasons for Church's conclusion that paternal rights were not violated).
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The Indian Child Welfare Act

The pernicious cultural and ethnic stereotyping that seems to lay at
the heart of the Mortara case has been echoed in various chapters of modern American history. One such chapter, reaching back decades rather
than centuries, recounts the treatment of Native American children at the
hands of non-Indian child welfare authorities and the circumstances surrounding passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA").12 0 This Act
was the product of rising concern in the mid-1970s over the consequences
to Indian children, families and tribes of abusive child welfare practices
that resulted in the removal of large numbers of Indian children not only
from their families, but also from their tribal communities. 12 1
By the time of the ICWA's passage in 1978, the formal and informal
adoption of Native American children by non-Native American families
had become so prevalent as to create a cultural crisis for many Indian
tribes.' 22 In 1974, four years prior to enactment of the ICWA, Senate
oversight hearings yielded an abundance of case stories, statistical data
and expert testimony documenting what one witness called "[t] he wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes [creating] the most
tragic aspect of Indian life today." 123 In its first decision applying the provisions of the ICWA, the Supreme Court recounted an alarming set of
statistics that helped drive passage of the Act:
Studies undertaken by the Association on American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974, and presented in the Senate hearings,
showed that 25 to 35% of all Indian children had been separated
from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or
institutions. Adoptive placements counted significantly in this total: in the State of Minnesota, for example, one in eight Indian
children under the age of 18 was in an adoptive home, and during the year 1971-1972 nearly one in every four infants under one
year of age was placed for adoption. The adoption rate of Indian
children was eight times that of non-Indian children. Approximately 90% of the Indian placements were in non-Indian
1 24

homes.

120. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
121. For further discussion of the concerns over the consequences to both
Indian children and families from abusive child welfare practices, see infra notes
148-49 and accompanying text.
122. See generally Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 93rd Cong. (1974)

[hereinafter 1974 Hearings] (statement of William Byler) (listing placement of Indian children in foster care and adoptive names).
123. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989);
1974 Hearings,supra note 122, at 3.
124. Choctaw, 490 U.S. at 33, citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531; see 1974 Hearings, supra note 122, at 75-83 (discussing surveys of states and placement rates for Indian versus non-Indian
children).
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Notwithstanding the extreme disruptive effect of these placement
practices on Native American Communities, many proponents of transracial adoption practices-not unlike the Papal authorities who supported
Edgardo's removal-were fully committed to the rightness of their actions
125
and to the sense that they were performing a valuable service.
Throughout the 1960s, one of the centerpieces of public policy regarding
Native American children was the Indian Adoption Project, a program undertaken in 1958 jointly by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Child
Welfare League of America.' 26 This program was seen by its sponsors as a
way of opening the security and permanency of the adoption process to a
cultural minority of disadvantaged children. 127 Most of the children
placed through the program went to live with non-Indian families, many at
great distance from their original homes, and most in communities where
128
Native American children were seen as "anomalies."
Descriptions of the program echo the rationale offered by Papal authorities for Edgardo's kidnapping, suggesting in no uncertain terms that
its subjects were being "rescued" from the harsh social and economic conditions then prevalent in many Native American communities.1 2 9 In a
1972 report detailing the results of a longitudinal study of some 100 children placed through the project, one of the central analysts of the relocation program recounts a series of statistical indicators reflecting the "tragic
plight" of American Indians. 130 These markers depict conditions of deprivation affecting the education, health, living conditions and overall stabil31
ity of living arrangements for Native American children in general.
Although the report's author, Professor David Fanshel, acknowledges that
removal from their families is not a solution for the "mass of Indian children suffering from longstanding national neglect and abuse," the report
nevertheless defends the program as having offered a valuable service to a
125. For further discussion of Native American child placement and those
who view it as correct see, infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text; KERTZER,
supra note 10, at 84 (stating Pope's belief in righteousness of cause).
126. See DAVID FANSHEL, FAR FROM THE RESERVATION: THE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN iii (1972) (describing initiation of Indian
Adoption Project).
127. See id. at ix ("The Indian Adoption Project was initiated ... out of concern to open up the option of adoptive placement to the American Indian child.").
128. See id. at 22, 33-36. The 1974 congressional hearings adduced evidence
that approximately 85% of all Native American children living in foster homes
were living in non-Indian homes. See 1974 Hearings,supra note 122, at 17, 72-94.
129. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7531 (describing reasons for removing children from Native American
communities).
130. See FANSHEL, supra note 126, at 22-24 (noting statistics indicating poor
conditions of Native American Indians).
131. See id. For example, the report notes that some 50 thousand Indian families live in unsanitary dilapidated dwellings, including huts, shanties and abandoned automobiles; that literacy, education and unemployment rates were among
the worst in the nation and that American Indian communities are plagued by
alcoholism and other health problems. See id.
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minority of children in the worst of circumstances. "The children placed
through the Indian Adoption Project were those who, from the perspective of the social workers who intimately knew their situations, were
1 32
doomed to lives of stark deprivation."'
The report's conclusions about how Native American children fared
in culturally dissimilar homes seem excessively sanguine. 133 Professor Fanshel recognizes at the outset the uncertain long-term consequences of separating children from their social and cultural heritage,' 3" acknowledging
as well the likelihood that many of the youths studied were likely to develop additional problems as they became teenagers. 135 However, his conclusions about the practices of the Indian Adoption Program, although
qualified, are generally quite positive: "More than fifty percent of the children were rated as showing relatively problem-free adjustments .

.

. and

another 25 percent were rated as showing adequate adjustments with
1 36
strengths outweighing weaknesses."
It is clear from his report that Professor Fanshel went to some lengths
to limit the degree of subjectiveness inherent in his measures of outcome.
Yet it is equally clear that he did not entirely succeed in avoiding the traps
set by nonnative social workers who claimed to know what was best for the
subjects of the program. The determination of how well children who
have been removed from their native culture and community fare in a new
setting is, to a large extent, inherently and inescapably subjective. Even
beyond the delayed effects that Fanshel acknowledges may be associated
with this kind of disruptive trauma, many of the costs of such an upheaval
simply cannot be quantified. 13 7 Much of the research and commentary
on the subject of adoption in general acknowledges the likelihood that as
adopted children grow older, they are increasingly likely to raise questions

132. Id. at 24.
133. See id. at 50-76. Professor Fanshel's assessment of the success of the Indian Adoption Program is based on an examination of the circumstances of a sample of approximately 100 Native American children placed through the program.
See id. at 53. His conclusions rest on a series of structured interviews with adoptive
and biological parents, following progress of the children over a period of approximately five years. See id. at 50-53.
134. See id. at 22 (noting uncertainties involved in separating children from
heritage).
135. See id. at 269. Professor Fanshel expresses particular concern about the
matter of interracial dating and courtship. See id.
136. Id. at 280. In a foreword to the study, then Executive Director of the
Child Welfare League of America, Joseph Reid, summarizes the study's conclusion:
"Fanshel found that the children had fared well physically, intellectually and emotionally and that the parents were highly satisfied with their experience in having
adopted Indian children." Id.
137. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for
CollaborativeAdoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 998-99 (1995) (noting
that adopted children have multiple losses, some deeply psychological).
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about their origins and about their lost family and heritage. 138 The difficulties associated with an adoptee's search for identity are likely to be par139
ticularly pointed for children adopted transracially.
Moreover, judgments about the seriousness of the deprivation associated with the environment from which a child is removed may also be
highly subjective. Fanshel's report analyzes the frequency of occurrence
of various "disabling conditions" of the biological mothers questioned in
the study, and the results are striking. 140 From his sample of ninety-eight
families, by far the most common reported problems were in the categories of alcoholism (39) and "personality disorder" (41).141 An additional
twenty-nine families were guilty of either "neglect" (18) or "severe neglect"
(11).142 In contrast, more objective measures of family disfunction were
comparatively infrequent, including history of incarceration (16), diagnosed mental illness (3) and abuse (1).143 These figures reflect the fact
that the majority of disabling conditions attributed to the adoptees' biological families were in categories that are fluid, difficult to quantify and
highly susceptible to the subjective judgments of the individuals responsi1 44
ble for diagnosing the family's problems.
138. See id. at 999-1001 (discussing adopted children's interests in origins);
WELFARE, Fall 1998, at 24, 27-28
(same).
139. See, e.g., RUTH McRoY & Louis ZURCHER, TRANsRAcIAL AND INTRACIAL
ADOPTEES 124-34 (1983) (discussing difficulties transracially, (specifically black
children in non-black families) adopted children have in search for identity); Arnold Silverman, Outcomes of TransracialAdoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 104, 10911 (1993) (same).
140. See FANSHEL, supra note 126, at 62 (evaluating disabling conditions of
mother).
141. See id. at 63. The House Report on the ICWA noted that:
One of the grounds most frequently advanced for taking Indian children
from their parents is the abuse of alcohol. However, this standard is applied unequally. In areas where rates of problem drinking among Indians and non-Indians are the same, it is rarely applied against non-Indian
parents. Once again cultural biases frequently affect decision making."
H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7532.
142. See FANSHEL, supra note 126, at 63 (listing results).
143. See id. (listing objective measures of familial problems).
144. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (discussing standards used for defining
mistreatment). This conclusion is echoed by the House Report accompanying the
ICWA:
Very few Indian children are removed from their families on the grounds
of physical abuse. One study of a North Dakota reservation showed that
these grounds were advanced in only 1 percent of the cases. Another
study of a tribe in the Northwest showed the same incidence. The remaining 99 percent of the cases were argued on such vague grounds as
"neglect" or "social deprivation" and on allegations of the emotional
damage the children were subjected to by living with their parents. Indian communities are often shocked to learn that parents they regard as
excellent caregivers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers.

Kenneth Watson, The Casefor Open Adoption, PUB.
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Like the Papal authorities who forced young Edgardo's removal, defenders of the Indian Adoption Program had their vocal critics. 14 5 Professor Fanshel's reliance on the non-Native social workers who claimed
intimate familiarity with the subject families contrasts sharply with much of
the commentary made during debates over the ICWA, passed by Congress
only two years after Fanshel's study. 14 6 Mr. Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of
the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, summarized succinctly what numerous witnesses saw as the principal reason for the high rates of removal of
Indian children:
One of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by nontribal government authorities who have no basis for
intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the individuals
who decide the fate of our children are at best ignorant of our
cultural values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and
convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or in147
stitution, can only benefit an Indian child.
Ultimately, both Congress and the Supreme Court responded to the
decimation of Native American communities. The House Report on the
ICWA expressly acknowledged the underlying concern that Indian child
welfare determinations should not be based on "a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family.' 46 Moreover, the condemnation of culturally insensitive judgments
made by non-Native social workers was an important theme in the
Supreme Court's decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
145. See 1974 Hearings,supra note 122, at 116-17 (criticizing placement of Indian Children with non-Indian families).
146. See FANSHEL, supra note 126, at 24.
147. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34-35
(1989); 1974 Hearings, supra note 122, at 191-92.
148. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7530, 7546
(seeking by-law to protect Indian child's rights as Indian). Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Mississippi Bank of Choctaw explains that:
The apparent intent of Congress was to overrule such decisions as that in
In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179 (1972), in which the State
placed an Indian child, who had lived on a reservation with his mother,
in a foster home only three days after he left the reservation to accompany his father on a trip.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 58 (citing Mack T. Jones, Indian
Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 1123, 1129 (1979)); see H.R.
REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 ("In judging the fitness of a particular family, many social
workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms, make decisions that
are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life and so they frequently
discover neglect or abandonment where none exists.").
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Holyfield.149 Certainly, state courts have gained considerable experience
in applying the ICWA in the years since Fanshel's study. As fights over the
scope of the ICWA rage on, the question of whether these same courts
have become better overall in accounting for cultural bias continues to be
50
a subject of considerable debate.'

B.

The Case of Walter Polovchak: The "Littlest Defector"

Clearly, concerns about the imposition of value-laden and subjective
best interest decisions lay at the heart of the ICWA. Is it fair to assume that
the ICWA put these concerns to rest? The extreme impact of placement
practices affecting Native American Children may never have been duplicated to quite the extent seen in the decades preceding the ICWA's passage, but the same type of problems clearly continue to recur on a regular
basis. Consider, for example, the celebrated case of Walter Polovchak. 151
In the spring of 1980, Michael and Anna Polovchak were Ukrainian
immigrants living in Chicago.1 52 For whatever reason, they became unhappy in the United States and decided to return to their homeland, then
still part of the former Soviet Union. 1 53 Their twelve year-old son, Walter,
was persuaded by other family members that he would be better off remaining in the United States. 154 Fearing that his parents would force him
149. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 30, 35 n.4. Justice
Brennan wrote in his opinion in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians that:
[O]ne of the particular points of concern was the failure of non-Indian
child welfare workers to understand the role of the extended family in
Indian society. The House Report on the ICWA noted: "An Indian child
may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are
counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be
socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the
nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental
rights."
Id. (quoting H.R. No. 95-1386, at 10).
150. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 522-30 (1996) (limiting application of the ICWA to situations where child's parents have significant relationship
with Indian tribal culture). In re Bridget R. provides a detailed account of the debate over the limits of state court jurisdiction over Indian children, the "existing
Indian family" doctrine, and the constitutional limits on the reach of the ICWA.
See id.
151. See generally Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming parental rights but remanding for new remedy); Polovchak v. Polovchak,
734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984) (unpublished disposition); Polovchak v. Landon, 614
F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (ruling that parents were denied due process rights);
In re Polovchak, 454 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. 1983) (granting parental rights).
152. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 732-33 (giving factual background of
case).
153. See id. (describing facts of case).
154. See id. (noting that sister also refused to return).
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to move, Walter secretly left home to live with an older cousin.1 55 His
parents sought police assistance in finding their son. 156 An international
incident ensued.
Once his story became known, Walter was dubbed "the littlest
defector."1 57 He was lionized in the press for his refusal to return to the
Soviet Union. His parents were vilified as traitors and scoundrels, 158 as
were the attorneys who represented them.1 59 The Cook County, Illinois
juvenile authorities intervened on behalf of Walter's best interest, removing him from his parents' custody and seeking permanent guardianship. 160 Within forty-eight hours Walter was granted political asylum in
the United States, in a proceeding of which his parents had no notice and
in which they were not permitted to participate.1 61 The State Department
took up his cause, on direct order of then Deputy Secretary of State, War62
ren Christopher. 1

155. See Charles Leroux, Whatever Became of That Soviet Kid Who Sued His Folks to
Stay Here? He's Become Joe Surburbia, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1999, § 5, at 1 (disclosing that
Polovchak ran away from parent's house).
156. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 732 (stating that parents sought assistance of police).
157. See, e.g., Phyliss Mensing, Walter Polovchak, Now 20, Writes Book; 'Littlest
Defector' Has No Regrets About Staying in U.S., L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1988, at 24;
Ludmilla Thorne, The Littlest Defector, Walter Polovchak, NAT'L REV., Mar. 18, 1983, at
314.
158. See Thorne, supra note 157, at 319 (recognizing public opinion). Assertions about the Polovchaks virtually mirrored allegations made against the
Mortaras nearly 130 years earlier. See generally KERTZER, supra note 10 (writing on
Edgardo Mortara's kidnapping). According to the attorney who obtained asylum
for Walter, Michael and Anna were abusive parents in both the Ukraine and in
Chicago, for example, "we found that Walter needed glasses very badly, he could
barely read . .

.

. We also noticed that [he] needed extensive dental care."

Thorne, supra note 157, at 318. It was suggested that the father's intention to
return to the Soviet Union was prompted by "very selfish" reasons, including the
desire to be reunited with his "girlfriend." Id. at 319. Michael Polovchak was said
to be "explosive" and "unbalanced." Id. at 320. According to one Ukrainian community activist, "One time, he physically attacked me, screaming that I was helping
[Walter's lawyer] deprive him of his son. Anna had to pull him away." Id.
159. See George F. Will, Safe From the ACLU, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1985, at
A25 (criticizing position of American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") in case).
Michael and Anna were represented by lawyers provided by the ACLU, including
co-author Steven Lubet. See Leroux, supra note 155, at 1, 4.
160. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 732-33 (stating that authorities intervened on Walter's behalf).
161. See id. at 733 (recognizing speedy asylum process and parent's challenge
based on due process rights); see also Wendy Leopold, The Littlest Defector Grows Up;
Soviet Immigrant Walter Polovchak Chronicles His American Dream, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3,
1988, § 6, at 1.
162. See Mensing, supra note 157, at 24 (noting Secretary of State's direct
involvement).
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Everyone 'just knew" it was better for Walter to stay in the United
States, rather than remain part of his parents' family. 163 One journalist
intimated that only Russian dupes would represent Anna and Michael:
"The Soviet Union howled. The Illinois chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union screamed. And for the next five years both worked tirelessly
to ship him back to the USSR."' 164 According to another, "[flifty states
would remove Walter from the custody of parents who abused him. But
the ACLU ...supports the right of Walter's father to commit the ultimate
1 65
and unappealable abuse of consigning him forever to a prison society."
An emigre lawyer was quoted as saying that, "[the Soviets] will never forget
or forgive what he did and said here. They will also do everything possible
to shake Walter's belief in God, and, eventually they may force him to
166
renounce his faith."
In the end, the Polovchak case had disparate legal and practical outcomes. The higher courts consistently ruled that Michael and Anna's parental rights had been violated, but the litigation continued until Walter
turned eighteen, making the legal issues moot and entitling him to obtain
United States citizenship in his own behalf. 167 His parents had by then
returned to their home in Lvov, now part of the non-Soviet, free-market,
independent Ukraine.1 68 Walter remains in the United States, having had
only occasional contact with his family in the years since he reached his
169
majority.
The government authorities who "protected" Walter from the evils
likely to befall him as a Soviet citizen would have done well to recall Il
Cattolico's defense of Edgardo's removal. 170 Whatever one thinks of the
parties or the principles in the Polovchak case, it is safe to say that the
matter was driven more by ideology than by child welfare. The authorities
who permitted Walter's separation from his family no doubt knew little of
what the boy's life was like in the home with his parents, and even less
about what Walter might expect day-to-day upon his return to his native
country. Although Walter's best interest was a constant refrain, there had
been no previous case (and there has been no subsequent one) in which
163. See Leopold, supra note 161, at 1 (noting that Polovchak's defection garnered support of Ukrainian community, anti-communists and both Carter and
Reagan Administrations).
164. Roger Simon, Land of the Free is American Way, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1985, at
5.
165. Will, supra note 159, at A25.
166. Thorne, supra note 157, at 320.
167. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming

parental rights but remanding for new remedy).

See generally Polovchak v.

Polovchak, 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984) (unpublished disposition); Polovchak v.
1985) (ruling that parents were denied due
Landon, 614 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ill.
process rights); In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d 212 (1983) (granting parental rights).
168. See Simon, supra note 164, at 5.
169. See Leroux, supra note 155, at 4.

170. See Lubet, supra note 24, at 974 (applying lesson of Edgardo Mortara case
to Walter Polovchak case).
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the federal government intervened to deny parents custody of their
child. 17 1 The best interest claim was at best a hook on which to hang the
true, and undoubtedly benevolent, purpose of Walter's partisans, which
was to ensure through any means possible that he could remain in the
United States.
C.

The Case of Alison Miles: The First Test of the "Baby Richard" Law

The history of Native American adoptions and the story of Walter
Polovchak both suggest cultural pitfalls that may stem from permitting the
State to make determinations about children's futures over the objecting
voices of their parents and communities. From a somewhat different perspective, the story of Alison M. suggests a related but distinct set of procedural concerns about the potential consequences of eroding traditional
protections against state interference with parent-child relationships. 17 2
In 1993, seventeen-year-old Christina Miles left her home in Chicago
73
with her fifteen-month-old baby, Alison, to visit her mother in Texas.'
The trip was an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation; following an argument during the visit, Christina's mother locked Christina out of the
home and left Alison with other family members, in conditions described
as "squalid" and "abusive."1 74 Unsure of how to recover custody of her
child, Christina turned for assistance to a family friend back in Chicago,
who had previously expressed an interest in adopting Alison shortly before
her birth:
In September 1993, Respondent, herself then a minor was faced
with an exigency that would tax the mental resources of an experienced adult. She was alone, in strange surroundings, and
her daughter had been taken away from her and turned over to
strangers. Without the benefit of family support, Respondent
175
turned to Petitioner for help.
According to Christina, the family friend, Colleen Henry, agreed to
assist her only on the condition that she relinquish the child for adop171. See Howard French, State Dept. Awarded Custody of African Boy in Abuse
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1998, at 22 (reporting child custody dispute). In the case
of Terrance Karamaba, the nine year old son of a Zimbabwean diplomat, the State
Department intervened to return the boy to his homeland, despite allegations by
the New York Human Resources Administration that he had been regularly beaten
by his father. See id.
172. See Michelle Campbell, Tangled Adoption Case Tests Baby RichardLaw, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Nov. 28, 1995, at 1 (recognizing effect of Baby Richard law on adoption
statutes).
173. See In re Alison M., No.93 CoA 1697, at 3 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Ill. Feb. 15,
1996) (unpublished Memorandum Decision and Judgment Order) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Alison M., Judgment Order] (discussing trip to Texas).
174. See id. at 4 (describing events during trip and child's living conditions).
175. Id. at 14.
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tion. 1 76 Lacking any alternative, Christina agreed to allow Ms. Henry to fly
to Texas and assist in recovering custody of the child.1 77 Upon their return to Chicago, Ms. Henry permitted Christina to stay in her home for
several weeks, but then in October 1993 purchased a plane ticket for her
and urged her to visit her boyfriend in Texas. 178 The same day, following
Christina's departure, Ms. Henry filed a petition seeking to adopt Alison
and secured an ex parte order granting her temporary legal custody of the
baby. 179
In her initial petition, Ms. Henry alleged that Christina had indicated
her willingness to consent to the adoption.18 0 Following her return to
Chicago, however, Christina refused to surrender her child for adoption.
Ms. Henry consequently terminated all visitation between Alison and her
mother and filed an amended petition to adopt, alleging that Christina
was an unfit parent.181 At the same time, Ms. Henry also requested that in
the event her petition to adopt was denied, she be granted full custody of
the child.18 2 Following a contested hearing in August of 1994-almost a
year after Ms. Henry coerced Alison's teenage mother into surrendering
custody of Alison-the trial court dismissed all of the allegations of unfit183
ness against Christina.
At this point in the case, the real battle for Alison's future was joined.
Although Illinois law permits the entry of ex parte interim custody orders,
the Adoption Act made no provision for rehearing the issue of temporary
custody, at the request of a parent who did not receive notice of the original hearing.' 8 4 Thus, upon the dismissal of Ms. Henry's petition to adopt,
176. See id. at 4 (stating alleged conditions of assistance).
177. See id. (relating events of trip).
178. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 2, In re Alison M., No. 93 CoA 1697,
(Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Ill. Feb. 15, 1996) (No. 96-0878) [hereinafter Alison M., Brief]
(relaying facts of case).
179. See id. (discussing initial filing of petition).
180. See Alison M.,Judgment Order, supra note 173, at 5 (recognizing alleged
condition).
181. See id. (stating that visitation rights were unlawfully terminated)
182. See In re Colleen Henry, No. 96-0878, at 2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Div. Dec. 24,
1997) (unpublished disposition) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Alison M., Appellate Order] (identifying request for permanent custody if adoption petition
failed).
183. See Alison M., Brief, supra note 178, at 3-4 (commenting trial court dismissed allegations). The allegations of unfitness against Ms. Miles were patently
without basis. See Alison M., Appellate Order, supra note 182 (affirming trial court
opinion). All but one of the specific allegations were dismissed on directed verdict
following the close of petitioner's case, and the remaining charge of abandonment
was dismissed following the presentation of evidence by Ms. Miles that she had
been prevented from seeing her baby by Ms. Henry. See id. (discussing procedure
of case and affirming trial court decision).
184. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/13(f) (West 1999). In other circumstances, the right of a parent who does not receive notice of a custody hearing, and
who loses legal custody pursuant to an ex parte order, can receive a hearing, for
example, under Illinois law governing abused and neglected children, a parent
who does not receive notice of an emergency shelter care hearing may file an
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Christina was presented with her first opportunity to challenge an order
depriving her of legal custody of her child, entered in her absence almost
a year previously.
Before 1994, Christina's recovery of custody of her daughter would
have been routine and uneventful. Prior to the Baby Richard case, Illinois
adoption courts generally recognized that the assignment of temporary
legal custody was dependent on the consideration of a petition to adopt
and that the completion of adoption proceedings would eliminate the
legal foundation for an interim custody order.' 8 5 Petitioners seeking to
adopt a child thus understood that the interim custody order was nothing
more or less than a device to ensure the orderly transition of responsibility
of a child and that no advantage could be gained from dilatory tactics
causing delays in the ultimate resolution of a contested adoption.' 8 6
All of this changed with the legislative backlash prompted by the Baby
Richard case. 8 7 In June 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down
its highly publicized decision vacating the finding of unfitness against
Otakar Kirchner and overturning his son's adoption.' 8 8 Legislators sympathetic to the putative adoptive family understood that the laws then in
effect would limit the family's ability to seek legal custody of the boy-who
at that point had lived with them for more than three years.' 89 With an
eye toward providing Richard's caregivers with a legal basis for keeping
the child in their home, the Legislature hastily passed the "Baby Richard"
legislation, amending the adoption statute to require a best interest hearing following a failed adoption, with the petitioners as necessary parties. 190
affidavit and demand a rehearing within 48 hours. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/2-10(4) (West 1993).
185. See Joseph Gitlin, "Baby Richard" Law Poses Many Questions for Adoption
Attorneys, CHI. DAILY LAw BULL.,June 19, 1995, at 6 (stating that "[ev]en the Illinois
legislature . . . rush[ed] to pour legislation on the fire [public outcry over 'Baby
Richard' case]").
186. See id. (mentioning temporary nature of interim custody order).
187. See id. (noting legislative backlash following Baby Richard case).
188. See In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ill. 1994) (vacating lower court
ruling).
189. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b) (West 1999); In re Peterson, 491
N.E.2d 1150, 1151-52 (Ill. 1986) (requiring third-party applicant for custody must
show parent intentionally relinquished physical custody of child, and only "[w] hen
this requirement is met [will] the non-parent be considered for legal custody of
the child under a best interest of the child standard"). Relevant provisions of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as interpreted by the Illinois
courts, precluded a third party from seeking custody of the child of a fit parent,
absent both the physical custody of the child and the consent of the child's parent
or parents. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b).
190. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b). The amendment provided that:
In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a petition for
adoption is denied, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the
temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject
of the proceedings pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The parties to said proceedings shall be the petitioners to the adoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological
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The Legislature thereby sought in effect to circumvent the limitations on
standing that would otherwise have prevented the boy's caregivers from
filing a request for legal custody. Thus, when Christina finally defeated
the charges of unfitness leveled against her by Ms. Henry, she was forced
to respond to a petition for permanent legal custody under this newly
minted statute.
What followed between Ms. Henry and Alison's mother was a pitched
battle, waged in both the courts and the press and marked by delay and
dilatory tactics. 19 1 The matter was not concluded in the trial court until
after a contested evidentiary hearing was held under a best interest stan92
dard, fully eighteen months after the adoption petition was dismissed.'
Alison, by then, was almost four years old. By the time she was permitted
to return to live with her mother, she had spent almost two and a half
years in the home of an unrelated woman who had dragged out legal proceedings in the hope that the mere passage of time would solidify an
otherwise legally groundless claim for custody.
In some respects, the trauma suffered by young Alison-forced from
a home where she had lived for most of her young life-mirrors the injustices served by the court system upon her more well-known cousins, Baby
Richard and BabyJessica. Like these other children, Alison was forced to
endure months of acrimony and contentious hearings over her future that
cannot possibly have been in her best interest. 193 Moreover, she was ultiparents whose parental rights have not been terminated, and other parties who have been granted leave to intervene in the proceedings.
Id. The legislation adding this language to the statute was conceived, drafted,
passed and signed into law all within less than three weeks after the Illinois
Supreme Court announced its decision vacating Baby Richard's adoption on June
16, 1994. See Illinois P.A. 88-550, Art. 9, § 975, effective July 3, 1994 (relaying legislative history).
191. See generally Campbell, supra note 172 (quoting attorneys involved in
case); Andrew Fegelman, Test of "Richard"Law Goes to Birth Mom, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
16, 1996, at Metrolake 1 [hereinafter Fegelman, Test] (discussing outcome of
case); Andrew Fegelman, "Baby Richard" Law Faces 1st Test in Custody Fight, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 28, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Fegelman, "Baby Richard'] (reporting seamy
details from trial); Gitlin, supra note 185 (discussing impact of law).
192. See In re Colleen Henry, No. 96-0878, at 2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Div. Dec. 24,
1997) (unpublished disposition) (on file with authors) (noting timetable of trial
court). Ultimately, in what can only be described as a legal sleight of hand, the
trial court determined that the petitioner was still obligated to satisfy the standing
requirement of the MDMA, notwithstanding the clear legislative intent behind the
Baby Richard law. See id. at 17-19. The trial court's refusal to either follow the
statute or find it constitutional was affirmed on appeal. See id.
193. See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMi L. REv. 79, 83-85 (1997) (relating
effects of adversary system on custody disputes). Professor Janet Weinstein aptly
notes that:
The adversary system is not humane. It does not concern itself with the
welfare of the parties involved in terms of how the process itself may affect them. Although much attention has been paid to attempting to create a more humane and child-centered courtroom, the process of
engaging in a battle with family members cannot be a positive experi-
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mately forced out of the home of a parent who had cared for her for most
of her life, into a home that was, at best, completely unknown.
Yet in one critical respect, Alison's story stands apart. In the cases of
BabyJessica and Richard, scholars and public commentators alike roundly
criticized the results of legal disputes that were driven by the application
of traditional due process safeguards protecting parental and familial autonomy. 1 94 In contrast, the harm to Alison arose in large part directly out
of the legal reforms prompted by these earlier cases. In October 1994,
when Colleen Henry began in earnest her quest to secure permanent legal
custody of the child, she had every reason to believe that she would be
successful. Public opinion generated by the Baby Richard case was still
strong, and the legislature had recently removed what seemed to be the
only legal barrier to her claim of custody.1 95 The child had been in her
care for a full year. Ms. Henry had good reason to believe not only that
the strength of her attachment with Alison would be central to the court's
judgment about the child's best interest, but also that the slow resolution
of her petition would only serve to solidify her claim for custody. In the
absence of the Baby Richard law, Alison's future would have been cleanly
and quickly resolved following the dismissal of unsubstantiated charges of
unfitness supporting the adoption petition. Instead, spurred by the hope
of winning a secondary claim for custody, Ms. Henry continued to battle
for another eighteen months. In this way, the harm suffered by the child
as a result of the court process was directly related to the legislation seeking to break down the due process safeguards embodied in the standing
96
requirement.1

ence; certainly it is not for the children who are often placed in the middle of this internecine warfare . . . Ultimately, proceedings which pit
children against parents, or place children in the middle of a battle between parents, are antithetical to the best interests of those children.
Id.
194. See id. (citing commentators and cases disputing due process
arguments).
195. See Campbell, supra note 172, at 1, 16 (stating that "[i]f not for the Baby
Richard law, Alison would be back with Gomez").
196. See Alison M., Judgment Order, supra note 173, at 17-19 (noting attempted breakdown of due process safeguards). After determining that Ms. Henry
lacked standing to pursue a claim for custody, the trial court nevertheless went on
to consider the merits of her case, concluding that the evidence presented by the
parties still justified restoring custody of Alison to her mother. See id. at 17. This
finding, too, was affirmed on appeal. See Alison M., Appellate Order, supra note
182, at 20-23. Although the authors acknowledge the possibility that the harm to
Alison stemming from the court hearings might have been lessened had she been
allowed to remain with Ms. Henry, this conclusion does not seem to be warranted
from the court's treatment of the evidence adduced at the best interest hearing.
See id.
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D.

The Saga of Elian Gonzalez

Walter Polovchak is no longer a boy, and his native Ukraine is no
longer part of the despised Soviet Union. Yet while the winds of foreign
policy constantly change, the existence of political factions remains a fixed
and essential element of a democratic regime, assuring the continuing importance of procedural safeguards that protect family relationships. No
case in recent memory demonstrates this truism more forcefully than the
saga of the Cuban boy named Elian Gonzalez.
On Thanksgiving morning, November 25, 1999, two Florida fishermen came across young Elian clinging to an inner tube found drifting in
the waters off of coastal Florida. 19 7 As the story of the boy's unlikely rescue unfolded, immigration authorities learned that three days prior to his
rescue, 5-year-old Elian, his mother and eleven other refugees had left
Cuba in a flimsy aluminum dinghy, bound for the United States. 198 When
their motor quit and high seas capsized the boat, the passengers abandoned the dinghy in favor of two large inner tubes towed behind as life
preservers. 199 Two days later, Elian's mother and nine other adults had
200
slipped into the sea and drowned.
The fishermen delivered the boy-sunburned and dehydrated-to
Coast Guard authorities, who arranged to have him hospitalized and
treated. 20 1 Upon Elian's release from the hospital, INS officials paroled
the boy to a great uncle in Miami, 20 2 who had fled Cuba ten years earlier
and who had met Elian only once previously. 20 3 With the support of anti-

Castro Cuban expatriates in South Florida, the great uncle, Lazaro Gonzalez, promptly submitted an application for asylum to the INS on behalf of
Elian, seeking to prevent his return to communist Cuba. 20 4 The conservative Cuban American National Foundation immediately seized on Elian's
197. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 7, Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-206CIV-MOORE, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3225, (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2000) [hereinafter
Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss]; Lisa Arthur et al., 5-year-old Survivor Clung to Inner
Tube Two More Rafters Rescued, but 11 Other Cubans May Have Died at Sea, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 26, 1999, at Al.
198. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 8; Little Rafter Leaves
Hospital, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27, 1999, at Al.

199. See Little Rafter Leaves Hospital, supra note 198, at Al.
200. See id.
201. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 7; Little Rafter Leaves
Hospital,supra note 198, at Al.
202. See Little Rafter Leaves Hospital, supra note 198, at Al; Sue Ann Presley,
Young Refugee at Center Of InternationalDispute; Father, Cuba Want Return of Boy Rescued at Sea, WASH. PosT, Nov. 30, 1999, at A3. Elian was paroled to his uncle pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (A), which grants authority to the Attorney General to
permit aliens in the United States to remain free from detention while their immigration status is considered, but provides that "such parole of such alien shall not
be regarded as an admission of the alien." 8 U.S.C. ' 1182(d) (5) (A) (2000).
203. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 13.
204. See Order at 3, Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-206-CIV-MOORE, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3225, (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Gonzalez, Order].
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plight, literally turning the youth into a poster-child for their continuing
political battle against the communist government in Cuba. 20 5 The Cuban-American community in South Florida began lobbying heavily for government permission to allow Elian to remain in the United States,
organizing a series of protests and demonstrations that brought traffic in
the city of Miami to a standstill.20 6 Like Walter Polovchak some twenty
years earlier, Elian quickly became a household name, capturing front20 7
page headlines in newspapers across the country.
Back in Cuba, Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, publicly called
for his son's return to his home in Cardenas. 20 8 Mr. Gonzalez and Elian's
mother had shared responsibility for Elian following their divorce. The
father claimed to be very close to his son and unaware of his ex-wife's plan
to flee Cuba with Elian. 20 9 When INS officials failed to return the boy
immediately, Cuban leader Fidel Castro issued sweeping condemnations
of the United States govenment, increased the numbers of troops stationed outside of the United States Interests Section in Havana and organized his own series of protests and rallies involving tens of thousands of
2 10
Cuban citizens.
For its part, the INS sought to remain focused on Elian. After paroling the boy to his great uncle, the INS launched an investigation into
Elian's circumstances, conducting interviews of both his extended family
205. See Ana Acle et al., Raft Survivor at Center of Spat, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 29,
1999, at Al; Presley, supra note 202, at A3.
206. See Miami Protests Erupt over Cuban Boy's Deportation, Police Arrest Dozens
Who Oppose U.S. Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Miami Protests
Erupt]; Sit-Ins Block Intersections and DisruptDade Traffic, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2000,
at Al [hereinafter Sit-Ins Block Intersections].
207. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Protesters Choke Miami in Rage over Cuban Boy,
PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 7, 2000, at Al); Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Officials Ask Judge to Return
Elian to Cuba, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2000, at Al); Jean Marbella, A pawn in a Political
Battle; 'El Milagro'" The Cuban 'miracle' boy has become a larger-than-lifesymbol for the
adultsfighting over his future, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 31, 2000, at Al; Miami Protests
Erupt, supra note 206, at Cl; Sit-Ins Block Intersections, supra note 206, at Al.
208. See, e.g., Jay Weaver, Cuban Father, Grandmother: Return Boy, MIAMI HER-

ALD, Dec. 31, 1999, at B3 (reportingJuan Miguel Gonzalez's appearance on nationally televised "Nightline" program and his plea for Elian's return home). More
formally, Mr. Gonzalez contacted the Cuban Foreign Minister the day after his
son's rescue, seeking assistance in securing the boy's return home. See Gonzalez,
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 9.

209. See Gonzalez, Order, supra note 204, at 4 (describing Juan Miguel's relationship with Elian); Fight Shifts to the Courts; Congress Subpoenas Boy; Family Files
Petition, MiAMi HERALD, Jan. 8, 2000, at Al (reporting that Elian's father was unaware of his ex-wife's plan to flee Cuba with his son).
210. See, e.g.,
Cuban Mothers Decry U.S. Delay: Angry Marchers in Havana Campaign to Reunite, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2000, at C1 (reporting mass demonstrations of
Cuban protesters); Juan 0. Tamayo, Castro Ultimatum: Return Boy in 72 Hours or
Migration Talks at Risk, MiAMi HERALD, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al (reporting increase in
troops stationed outside U.S. Interests section in Havana, Fidel Castro's demand
for immediate return of child, and promised "battle for world opinion").
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in South Florida and his father and grandparents in Cuba. 2 11 Ultimately,
the INS concluded that Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, was fully capable of making decisions on behalf of his son, and INS officials accordingly credited his decision to withdraw the asylum application submitted
2 12
on Elian's behalf by great-uncle Lazaro.
Enraged at the prospect that the United States Government would
contemplate repatriation of a Cuban national, Lazaro Gonzalez and his
legal team brought a custody action before an elected Florida State Court
judge with close ties to the Cuban community in South Florida, 2 13 and
secured an ex parte order purportedly granting Lazaro both temporary
legal custody of Elian and the legal authority to speak for the boy on immigration matters. 21 4 The Florida family court judge-Rosa Rodriguez-acted under a statute permitting certain close family members to seek
temporary legal custody of a child, either upon the consent of the parent
or upon a showing that a non-consenting parent unfit to care for the
21 5
child.
Armed with the family court order, Lazaro returned to the INS and
demanded again that his request for asylum on Elian's behalf be considered. 216 Backed by Attorney General Janet Reno, the INS again refused,
21 7
responding that only Elian's father was authorized to speak for the boy.
However, Attorney General Reno declined to take any immediate steps
toward Elian's return to Cuba, instead inviting Lazaro's lawyers to seek
review of her decision in the federal district court.21 8 Lazaro obliged, filing a federal lawsuit seeking to compel the INS to initiate asylum proceed211. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 10-22; Gonzalez, Order,
supra note 204, at 3-6.
212. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 22-24; Gonzalez, Order,
supra note 204, at 7-8.
213. See, e.g., Manny Garcia et al., Judge Employed Elian Family Advisor, MuiAi
HERALD,Jan.

12, 2000, at Al (reportingjudge's financial and political ties to one of

primary advisors to Lazaro Gonzalez and his family).
214. SeeGonzalezv. Gonzalez, No. 00-00479 (Fla. Cir. Ct.Jan. 10, 2000) (Temporary Protective Order), at 4 (granting Lazaro temporary legal custody of child
and authority to speak for him in immigration matters) [hereinafter Gonzalezz,
Family Court Order]; Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 25-27.
215. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. ' 751 (West 1999). This statute permits an
award of temporary legal custody over the objection of a parent "only upon a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child's parent [is] unfit." See id.
§ 751.05(3). This standard is the same high standard which the State must satisfy
under the Constitution in order to permanently sever the legal relationship between a parent and a child. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982)
(requiring states to support allegations of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before they can permanently sever parent-child relationship).
216. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 27-29 (discussing Attorney General Reno's response to Lazaro Gonzalez's request for reconsideration).
217. See id. (same); Gonzalez, Order, supra note 204, at 10 (noting letters from
Attorney General Reno and INS stating that Elian's father was only person authorized to speak for him).
218. See, e.g., Frank Dawes & Andrew Viglucci, Reno Rejects Judge's Ruling in
Boy's Case, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al.
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ings and indefinitely preclude Elian's return to Cuba and reunification
2 19
with his father.
For the next several months, with Lazaro's federal lawsuit pending,
the propaganda war between entrenched political enemies continued unabated. 220 Advocates on both sides traded accusations and challenges, arguing vociferously over the relative merits of communism and democracy,
and what is "best" for Elian. 221 Anti-Cuban politicians in the United States
pursued various tactics designed to prevent Elian's return to his homeland, including the highly unusual introduction of a special "private bill,"
designed to decree citizenship for the boy and preclude the INS from deporting him. 22 2 One Congressional Representative went as far as issuing a
subpoena commanding six-year-old Elian to testify before a House Committee, in an unabashed attempt to force his continuing presence in the
United States. 223 Elian himself remained caught squarely in the middle of
this political fracas, no doubt appreciating nothing of the debate other
than that his future depended on its outcome.
On March 21, 2000, the federal court dismissed Lazaro's lawsuit, finding no merit in his contention that the INS' refusal to consider his asylum
applications violated either Elian's or his own statutory or constitutional
rights. 224 As of this writing, Elian remains under the care of his great-

219. See generally Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-0206 (So. D. Fla., Jan. 27,
2000).
220. Major newspapers across the country maintained weekly, or even daily
coverage of the story throughout the early months of 2000. A Westlaw search of
the Miami Herald alone returned more than 400 stories, opinions and letters on
Elian's case, from January through March 2000.
221. See, e.g., Jay Weaver, Elian'sFate Unclear, MIAmi HERALD, Dec. 1, 1999, at
BI (reporting claim of Lazaro Gonzalez's lawyer that it "would not be in Elian's
best interest to be returned to the oppression in Cuba"). Even Presidential candidates George W. Bush and Albert Gore weighed in on the boy's fate, declaring
respectively that Elian's best interests should be determined by the Florida family
court (Bush), and that the "real fault here lies with Fidel Castro" (Gore). See
Elian'sFuture Is up to Reno, Judge Says U.S. Can Wait out Appeal or Return Boy to Cuba,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 22, 2000, at Al. Among the more pointed charges were the
claims of Cuban officials that the arrest of an alleged Cuban spy and the expulsion
of a Cuban diplomat in February 2000, were part of a United States Government
plot to impede Elian's return to his homeland. See Steven Pearlstein, CubanDiplomat Remains in Canada;Havana OrdersAlleged Spy to Stay, Requests 30-Day Visa, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 29, 2000, at Al).

222. See Karen DeYoung, Rare Act of CongressIs Plannedfor Elian: GOPLeaders
Back Citizenship Bills, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 2000, at A3.
223. See Sue Anne Pressley & Karen DeYoung, Hill Committee Subpoenas Cuban
Boy, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2000, at A12 (discussing subpoena issued by Rep. Dan
Burton (R-Ind.) commanding boy's testimony before House committee).
224. See Gonzalez, Order, supra note 204, at 49-50 (dismissing Lazaro Gonzalez's lawsuit).
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uncle, the Florida family court suit still pends, and Lazaro Gonzalez has
22 5
promised further appeals and delays.
Even this brief review of the legal tactics used in Elian Gonzalez's situation teaches-yet again-that the interests of children are simply not
served when politics dictate decisions about the future of a child. Particularly noteworthy are the actions of the Florida family court-granting
Lazaro Gonzalez temporary legal custody and purporting to authorize him
22 6
to pursue a claim for asylum in the federal system on behalf of Elian.
The statute relied upon by Judge Rodriguez permits only certain specified
members of a child's extended family to request temporary legal custody
of the child. 227 In granting Lazaro Gonzalez's preliminary request, how-

ever, the family court judge made no mention of the fact that Elian's
great-uncle was not among the specified relatives authorized to proceed
under the statute, and therefore clearly lacked standing to pursue his
claim. 228 Moreover, in purporting to assign to Lazaro Gonzalez the "legal
authority to assert and protect such rights as the child may have under
United States immigration law," 229 Judge Rodriguez paid equally little
heed to principles of federalism that preclude state courts from interfering with matters preempted by federal law, including immigration
230
statutes.
If Judge Rodriguez's decision indeed lacked legal foundation, her
conclusion that Lazaro Gonzalez's petition established a primafaciecase of
imminent risk of harm2 3 1 can only be explained in political context.
Though styled as an order designed only to preserve the "status quo," the
initial family court order found that absent judicial intervention, Elian
would likely have returned promptly to Cuba, creating "an emergency
which requires the Court to exercise its juridiction for Elian's protection." 23 2 At the time this finding was made, the family court had before it
225. See Elian'sFutureIs up to Reno, Judge Says U.S. Can Wait out Appeal orReturn

Boy to Cuba, MIAMI

HERALD,

Mar. 22, 2000, at Al.

226. See Gonzalez, Family Court Order, supra note 214, at 4 (granting Lazaro

Gonzalez temporary legal custody and authorizing him to speak for Elian in asylum proceedings). In dismissing Lazaro's federal suit, the District Court declined
to consider the effect of the Family Court Order, finding on other grounds that he
had sufficient standing to pursue a claim on Elian's behalf. See Gonzalez, Order,
supra note 204, at 20 n.15.
227. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 751.011 (West 1999) (defining extended family
members includes child's "brother, sister, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or cousin.")
228. See Gonzalez, Family Court Order, supra note 214, at 5 (granting Lazaro
Gonzalez temporary legal custody without mentioning his status as unauthorized
relative under statute).
229. Id. at 5.
230. See Gonzalez, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 197, at 40-50 (explaining doctrines of field and conflict preemption and their application to immigration law).
231. See Gonzalez, Family Court Order, supra note 214, at 5 (stating that
"[p]etitioner has established a primafaciecase that Elian may be subject to imminent harm if temporary relief is not granted").
232. Id. at 4.
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only the generalized charges in Lazaro's petition, "alleging that if Elian is
returned to Cuba he faces threat of mistreatment or abuse, including the
loss of any due process rights he may have under United States immigration law, as well as harm to his physical and mental health and emotional
well being." 233 Lazaro claimed nothing specific about the parenting capacity of Juan Miguel Gonzalez, or about the nature of his relationship
with his son. Rather, his charges were based solely on broad concerns
about the relative lack of political, economic, and other opportunities
available to children raised in Cuban society. Moreover, despite Juan Miguel's widely reported opposition to the boy's remaining in the United
States, 2 34 neither Lazaro nor the family court made any effort whatsoever
to address the statutory requirement that an objecting parent be found
"unfit, by clear and convincing evidence. '23 5 As a consequence, the
court's conclusion that Elian would be in imminent and immediate risk of
harm if returned to Cuba 23 6 had less to do with Juan Miguel's fitness to
parent than with the fitness of Fidel Castro to govern his country.
To some, the refusal to return a child to an impoverished, economically depressed, and politically oppressive nation may seem an unassailable
choice. Yet ultimately, the parallels between the plight of Elian Gonzalez
and the kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara seem inescapable. At comparable
ages, both boys were separated by state authorities who paid superficial
heed to the requirements of due process, but who seemed in retrospect to
be swayed chiefly by the partisan winds of the day. The rhetoric of Edgardo's captors- disparaging the spiritual and temporal opportunities
available to children raised in a Jewish community-was no less forceful
than that of detractors of the Cuban state a century and a half later. 237 In
the end, many of the arguments offered to support Elian's separation
from his father in Cuba seem nearly indistinguishable from the conceptual justifications for Edgardo's removal from his parents, and from the
destruction of a family for the sole offense of being Jewish.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With questions about cultural and ethnic stereotyping as a backdrop,
the story of Edgardo Mortara's kidnapping and its aftermath teaches valuable lessons about the use and limits of legal process in furtherance of state
objectives. Although Edgardo's family claimed no guaranteed right to ap233. Id. at 3.
234. For a further discussion ofJuan Miguel Gonzalez's opposition to Elian's
presence in the United States, see supra note 209 and accompanying text.
235. FLA. STAr. ANN. § 751.011 (stating that requirement of unfitness be
shown by clear and convincing evidence).
236. See Gonzalez, Family Court Order, supra note 214, at 5 (finding that Elian
would be in imminent risk of harm if returned to Cuba).
237. Of course, Elian was rescued at sea and brought to the United States to
save his life. But the Papal authorities in 1858 also regarded the covert baptism of
Edgardo Mortara as a miraculous deliverance.
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peal their son's removal to Catholic authorities, his case was nevertheless
notable for its procedural regularity. From the Inquisitor's response to
the initial revelation about the boy's baptism, through Edgardo's removal
from his home, to the Pope's answer to the legal appeal carefully prepared
by the family's advocates, the case proceeded with all the hallmarks of contemporary due process. Like modern families, the Mortaras depended on
the available avenues of legal recourse that channel the state's enforcement of religious, social and cultural ideals. Their ultimate failure to
achieve redress casts doubt not only on the value of procedural safeguards
against undue interference in family relations by state agents, but also, in
the end, on the utility of such safeguards as an aid to achieving outcomes
that are truly in the "best interest" of the child.
Troubling stories about children whose lives have been up-ended by
rigid legal processes no doubt will continue to demand the attention and
concern of the caring public. Moreover, the continuing reexamination of
tested legal doctrines should be seen as part of a healthy and needed effort to ensure that our legal systems do the best possible job of protecting
vulnerable children from avoidable harm.
If legal doctrines are to be rewritten to extend the protection of the
courts to relationships between children and surrogate parent figures, the
costs of such a change should be understood and weighed. To the parent
who seeks to preserve or protect a custodial relationship with his or her
child, there would likely be little to distinguish the burden of facing a
threshold evidentiary hearing to determine if a third-party claimant has in
fact established a psychological parent-child relationship, from a fullblown best interests custody hearing. Considerable room remains for debate about the relative importance of shielding families from state intervention and about when a parent's conduct justifies such intervention. If
in fact, however, there is a value to the preservation of threshold safeguards that protect fit parents from challenges to their presumptive right
to raise their families as they see fit, it must be acknowledged that expanding the role of the courts to determine children's futures must necessarily sacrifice this value on the altar of the "best interest of the child."
Moreover, the cautionary tale of Edgardo Mortara, with vivid and disturbing clarity, drives home another point: so called best interest judgments simply cannot be freed from the cultural biases of those who would
seek to impose theirjudgments on the relationships between children and
parents. As Professor Robert Levy argues, caution in using the standard as
a guidepost is warranted because of "the invitation the 'best interests' standard's indeterminate qualities offers to judges to award custody to those
litigants whose attributes and values most resemble their own." 2 38
To be sure, courts that have been legitimately charged with the task of
deciding a child's future may have no choice but to ground their judg238. Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilitiesfor Extended Family Members?, 27
FAM. L.Q 191, 197 (1993).
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ments in a view of the child's interests that derives from personal experience. Yet in the end, judges are human, prone to the same prejudices and
fallibilities as any person who acts with responsibility for a child. The stories of Edgardo and his more modern counterparts suggest that even
seemingly clear-cut procedural safeguards are often clouded by subjective
judgments. This inescapable fact suggests good reason to be skeptical of
the claim that the overall quality of justice afforded to children by our
legal system can be enhanced by leaving courts free to decide when and
how the state should interfere with parent-child relationships, unfettered
by anything other than their own biases, experiences and notions about
the "best interest" of the child.
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